Abandoning AUKUS Pillar One Would Gravely Damage the U.S. Alliance

An article in The Strategist by Mike Keating and Jon Stanford on 22 August calling for abandoning the nuclear-submarine element of AUKUS is unconvincing. Most fundamentally, the authors, while arguing that the agreement aligns Australia too closely with US strategy, propose a solution that would gravely damage the alliance.

Also, Australia’s international credibility as a defence partner would be destroyed, and the US-Australia strategic alliance would suffer probable irreparable damage. It could very well collapse. Nor would Japan, India, Indonesia or any other regional power have strong reason to trust us again.

The authors say AUKUS was intended by the administration of president Joe Biden as ‘maintaining US primacy … by containing China to the first island chain, which would require sustaining the autonomy of Taiwan.’ This is incorrect. AUKUS is a technology-sharing agreement to provide nuclear powered but conventionally armed submarines under the Pillar One Optimal Pathway, and, with Pillar Two (not a subject of the Keating and Stanford article), cooperation in several key technology priority areas. Both pillars are designed to counter the growing Chinese military edge in many of these technology areas and respond to a recognised assessment that Australia needs SSNs to meet its long-term maritime security requirements in a highly contested operational environment. This includes, as Jennifer Parker notes, defending vital sea lanes of communication, upon which this nation’s economy and society depend on to function.

AUKUS seeks to contribute to deterring war and preserving the security interests of the partners through maintaining an effective balance of power against a rising and would-be hegemonic China. AUKUS contributes to US-led integrated deterrence alongside Britain and Australia and in Pillar Two brings the possibility of Japan, South Korea, Canada and New Zealand also contributing on a project-by-project basis. At its most fundamental level, integrated deterrence is designed to develop closer defence cooperation between the United States and its allies across the Indo-Pacific. It is not about just protecting the US’s interests, as the authors imply. Integrated deterrence reinforces the US’s extended deterrence security guarantees to its key partners, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia, which include implied extended nuclear-deterrence guarantees. It’s the importance of deterrence that is also one of the reasons why the US maintains forward bases, to reinforce those guarantees with forward presence and posture and, in doing so, reduce the risk of war, be it across the Taiwan Strait, in the South China Sea, or on the Korean Peninsula. The same can be said for US military forces operating from Australia.

The authors attack integrated deterrence, claiming it is an erosion of Australian sovereignty. Certainly, the US would see importance in one of its most important strategic allies, Australia, being willing to help support US forces in what would be their hour of greatest need if China tried to subjugate Taiwan. There would be very good reasons for Australia to do so, but the decision for commitment of military forces is for Canberra to decide.

The Australian government does need to confront head-on the issue of how it would respond to a Chinese blockade or invasion to forcibly impose unification on a free and democratic Taiwan. It is nonsensical for Australia to not be fully involved with the US in advanced planning on how the Australian Defence Force might play a role in supporting its most important ally at its time of greatest need, as well as with other key allies, such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, that would likely be involved in such a war. Such planning would have to include how Australia would employ its SSNs and also a much broader range of military capabilities, basing and logistical support.

This should not be seen as a ‘loss of sovereignty’. It is incumbent upon the Australian government to be open and frank with the Australian people about the challenge posed by China, as argued by Alex Bristow, and why it is important for Australia to stand alongside its allies in countering aggression—much as we did during the World War II, as explained by Michael Pezzullo.

Finally, the authors argue that Australia ‘should extend further into our strategic policy what James Curran calls the “Australian straddle between America and China.’ It’s a bit optimistic to assume things will be business as usual, having turned our back on our most vital ally. Suggestions from the authors that somehow elements of the US-Australia alliance would be maintained after Australia withdrew from Pillar One of AUKUS ignore the probability that the alliance would collapse, and with it, so would the foundation for Australia’s defence and security.

The outcome of the authors’ proposed policy would be Australia on its own. Notions of 12 French SSNs and a continued US commitment after ending AUKUS are fanciful. The recent debate over increasing defence spending to 3.5 percent of GDP would look quaint: get ready for 6 or 7 percent to ensure true defence self-reliance without US assistance. And we might need to seriously consider nuclear weapons if we wanted true self-reliance absent US extended nuclear deterrence.

There would, admittedly, be a cheap option: simply accommodating Beijing’s interests at our expense in terms of national security and vital national interests.

Sticking with AUKUS Pillar One sounds much better.

Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI.

This article appeared originally at The Strategist (ASPI).

Image of Virginia-class fast-attack submarine USS Hawaii preparing to moor at HMAS Stirling, Western Australia: Victoria/US Navy.