Law and Obedience to Orders

On October 12, Admiral Alvin Holsey confirmed that not only was he was stepping down from his position as Commander, U.S. Southern Command, but that he intended to retire from the naval service. Within a few days, the online publication “The Hill” was suggesting that Holsey was leaving his post because of legal objections he might have to the Trump Administration’s actions directed at Venezuelan, narco-terrorism, and specifically the destruction of purported drug boats. Across a broad spectrum, the media began to actively suggest that Holsey personally determined that the administration’s activities were illegal, and that he had determined that he would not be the command face of those activities.

The answer is that we simply do not know exactly why Admiral Holsey, a mere one year into a three-year tour, decided to step down from SOUTHCOM. The media gleefully and repetitively suggests that Holsey made a righteous stand, while offering no evidence in support of that contention. They were and are, it seems, projecting their wishes upon Holsey. As for the Navy, it is reported in retired flag-officer circles that while Holsey has discussed the matter with at least one retired four-star admiral, the content of that conversation is strictly guarded. Further, it appears that Holsey’s staff remains in the dark as to what led to the admiral’s decision.

Actually, there are issues which suggest that Holsey’s decision is not related to a questioning of legality regarding those strikes on purported drug boats. Key to this is the fact that by the time he elected to retire, four boats had already been attacked and destroyed, resulting in 21 deaths. If Holsey was attempting to make a demonstration of opposition to that which he deemed an illegal order, it seems sensible to imagine that he would have made his stand before he directed those strikes.

Second, and of critical import, military officers do not and have never questioned the legality of orders received from the National Command Authority, i.e., the President and the Secretary of Defense. It simply isn’t done. Throughout American history, these orders have always been, and still are, presumed by the military to be legal. While admirals and generals have crossed swords with the National Command Authority (NCA) in the past, most notably in the case of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, those clashes involved policy, and not direct military action.

This is not to say that the National Command Authority (NCA) has not issued orders which may have been considered, at least in retrospect, to be illegal. For example, the entire Iran-Contra Affair of the 1980s, in which covert arms transfers to Iran, undertaken to fund Nicaraguan Contras, violated congressional restrictions. However, the only military involvement in the affair was that of renegade National Security Council member Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and retired Major General Richard Secord.  Having said that, there is no record of the President or the Secretary of Defense ever issuing illegal orders to the military, writ large, and it is unrealistic to imagine that Holsey questioned the order to strike.

As for military officers and their obedience to orders from above, there are important factors to consider. The oaths taken by officers and enlisted personnel are different from one another in one primary regard. In the enlisted oath, people swear that they “will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”  In the officer’s oath, on the other hand, there is no vow to obey orders. Instead, they swear to only to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. Enlisted personnel don’t have the choice. They are required to obey orders, and they are not allowed to judge legality. Officers, on the other hand, are expected to refuse orders they understand to be unlawful.

In theory, this could present a problem, but in practice it seldom does. Certainly, there are some orders an officer might receive which are clearly illegal; for example, “shoot those prisoners.” By and large, however, officers never have to cross this bridge. In reality, those few officers who might face some sort of esoteric legal question are only the most senior - those who are in command of actual forces. Whether strikes on boats in international waters in national self-defense are legal is that sort of question. This explains why admirals and generals in command of forces have entire legal staffs assigned to them. Holsey, whether he trusted the command to strike or not, has lawyers who serve as checkers for him. Evidently, they didn’t balk at the directive to sink boats. And then, if someone like Holsey directs his forces to conduct these strikes, his forces presume that the issued orders are legal, and that senior military lawyers checked these orders beforehand.

So, while the entire question as to whether Trump’s actions vis-a-vis Venezuela are legal or not may be complex, and subject to interpretation – at least from the perspective of some governmental personnel, or those in the obscure halls of the academy, or many in the media –citizens can rest assured that military lawyers have examined the legality of the strikes, at multiple levels, and have found them to be legitimate.   Were they not, the military would absolutely decline to carry them out.

In short, for those easy problems, e.g., starving prisoners and torture, officers can decide. But mostly, it is not their job to sort through complex legalities, unless they are in command of an entire organization at the top of the food chain. Were this questioning to happen at every possible level, the entire effort would grind to a halt. The truth is that officers presume – correctly – that the SECDEF and President’s orders are legitimate and carefully vetted at the highest military level.

As for Admiral Holsey, there is another entirely more plausible theory regarding his sudden departure. On May 5, 2025, Secretary of Defense Pet Hegseth signed a memo ordering a minimum 20% reduction of four-star general/admiral positions in the active component. Beyond that, it is also plain that the Trump Administration has a metric by which they decide whether an officer is sufficiently supportive of the President’s vision. What this metric is, is unclear, but it plainly includes questions related to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) factors. And we do know that a number of senior officers have fallen across the breakers on this issue, leading to their removal. Is it not more likely that rather than Holsey resigning in protest, he was quietly shown the door – for one reason or another – by Secretary Hegseth?

As for Holsey’s silence on the matter, it is sensible to guess that in exchange for him going “quietly,” he would be allowed to retire not as a three-star, but as a four-star admiral. By law (10 U.S. Code § 1370) in order to retire as a four-star admiral, an officer must complete three years in grade. Holsey attained his fourth star on 7 November 2024, so he falls well short of the necessary “time-in-grade.” Consequently, the law requires him to retire as a three-star admiral. However, the Secretary of Defense can reduce that time-in-grade requirement from 3 years to 2 years, by his own authority, following a waiver process. The difference between retirement as a vice admiral rather than a full admiral is not trivial. Yes, there is a difference in pay, but of far greater importance is the tradable prestige associated with retirement as a vice admiral versus a full admiral. There are 36 three-star admirals active today. Conversely, there are only six four-stars. Four-star admirals, you see, are the rare breed and fall in line for enormous, post-Navy compensation, as well as historical note.

Retire quietly and as a four-star. Or, if you make this difficult – if you make a scene - not only will you be unceremoniously booted, but you will be time-demoted and forced out as a three-star.

Of course, no one knows, yet, except of course for a tight and silent circle of players. What we absolutely do know is that until Holsey speaks for himself, the media’s conviction that he found the strikes illegal is nothing more than media-based wish casting.           

Captain Eyer is a retired Surface Warfare Officer who served on active duty for 27 years. He deployed in seven cruisers and commanded three Aegis cruisers: USS Thomas S. Gates (CG 51), USS Shiloh (CG 67), and USS Chancellorsville (CG 62). Captain Eyer completed tours on both the Navy Staff and the Joint Staff and attained a master’s from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tuft’s University. He was the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Author of the Year in 2017.