
The Navy's Mix of Sparks and Gasoline
Last updated 09:57 PM EDT • Read time: 8m
A Fight Against Nature
I have two daughters. If either of them told me they wanted to join the Service, I would be proud, and fully supportive. They do, and should, have the right to serve on the same ships that I did. Still, based upon my experience as the executive officer of the first fully integrated cruiser, and my subsequent commands of several fully integrated cruisers, this is clear: mixing men and women in combat ships comes at a demonstrable cost to effectiveness. Not because the women are less effective or engaged, but because of the enormous burdens placed upon the ship's ability to prepare for war when you mix sparks and gasoline.
The sustainment of the entire human race is inescapably dependent upon the attraction that men and women feel for one another. It is also inescapably true that in a combat unit, the mixing of genders impacts the "Good Order and Discipline" of these units – and that degrades their ability to prepare for combat.
There is a paradox here. Women should be allowed to serve in combat units: Men and women are inescapably attracted to one another, and that's good: However, because of this attraction, women and men serving together suboptimizes performance.
Problems persistently arise involving the interface between men and women. Ships and submarines, for example, get inundated by waves of jealousy, disruption, loss of concentration, and favoritism. This is not the private sector where people go home at night. Sailors live cheek and jowl, sometimes for nine months at a time. There is no escape from the consequences of putting men and women together in ships.
Before women in combat units, there was a vital and palpable cohesion; a glue that bound everyone together. Following the advent of women, a split, throughout the crew, was easily observable. Sailors were, by and large, unable to assume the gender blindness mandated by higher authority. Cohesion changed into a competition for the attention of the opposite sex. Just like in real life. While this erosion is impossible to quantify, it is plain to those who served before, and then after, the integration of women. It has metastasized into a greatly diminished Fleet.
This is the inevitable fallout of putting healthy young men and women, with a natural inclination to stick together like magnets, into an enclosed environment, for extended periods, and under great stress. Like magnets, they begin to match up and stick with one another. Men and women began to behave – quite naturally – as if they were once again in a high school hallway.
As nature intended – but not as wanted in a cohesive combat unit.
The Rosetta Stone
For those who seek to understand the Navy, it is essential to understand what happened during and after the 35th Annual Tailhook Association Symposium in Las Vegas. "Tailhook '91" is the Rosetta Stone, without which you cannot understand what has happened to the Navy.
Briefly, following the convention, which was aimed at those who fly or have flown off aircraft carriers, several guests began to lodge complaints regarding the behavior of those Aviators. It was alleged that those officers had sexually assaulted up to 83 women and seven men or otherwise engaged in "improper and indecent" behavior.
It was quickly disclosed that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Frank Kelso, and other senior officers, had been a guest at Tailhook that year. The reaction of these leaders when confronted by the waves of Congressional and media fury? They hadn't seen anything amiss at the symposium, and they were "shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on here!" This was the most ridiculous sort of fabulism, and everyone in the Fleet knew it.
Yet, instead of taking personal responsibility, these leaders began an inquisition looking for junior officers upon whom to pin the blame. The investigations identified over 100 officers potentially involved in improper conduct, including sexual assault. However, the legal outcomes were limited due to issues including faulty evidence, uncooperative witnesses, and a rush-to-judgment mentality. Only one individual was referred to court martial. Ultimately there were no convictions.
Still, Navy leadership was so mortified by the entire affair that the Navy thoughtlessly rushed to put women into combat units, if only to calm the waters of "they just don't get it." No one asked, "should we do this, and what will be the result?" The Fleet was steam-rolled by admirals who just wanted the noise to stop.
Making it So
Those who presumed that simply because it was (and is) against the rules, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines would obey the command were engaged in the most ridiculous folly. Those leaders – including civilian activists and elected officials – all knew, or should have known, what would happen when you mixed men and women. For decades certain non-combatant classes of ships had women as members of their crews. Those ships, and particularly submarine and destroyer tenders, shared a common and well-earned reputation as madhouses of sexual misconduct of the most alarming sort – including prostitution and rape.
It didn't matter.
Integration in combat ships began almost immediately, along with a mandate that there would be no inappropriate interaction between men and women. All would be gender blind was presented as if, by fiat, the tide could simply be stopped.
At ground zero, there were two approaches undertaken by commanding officers. In one tribe, commanders simply chose to believe that the rules were clear and that the policing of the crew's behavior was not only unnecessary but unseemly. The other tribe attempted to hold a hard line and enforce the rules. Those in the first group, with their foolish notion that every 18-year-old Sailor would be "good" were soon swamped by reality, and many of their careers were terminated as reality revealed itself. As for the other group, running a taut ship became an exhausting, impossible, and distracting burden. How could they do their appointed job of preparation for combat, while at the same time acting as a sort of School Marm, policing all the students who were so resolutely determined to pursue their natural inclinations? Beyond that, no one was grateful to them. Sexual misconduct kept the Navy in the unwanted spotlight. Ultimately, these captains' bosses began to presume that they were unable to handle integrated crews owing to their professional incompetence.
Either choice was fraught with peril. Ultimately, commanding officers figured out that it was best and safest for all concerned to turn a blind eye to all but the most severe incidents.
Nature had handily defeated good order and discipline.
The Way Ahead
It is important to understand that the current generation has no idea as to what has been lost. They never lived during the era of all-male crews. Consequently, they have no example against which they can measure the situation.
Right now, men and women are not being deterred from essentially unbridled sexual congress in your combat Fleet. The Navy's official position that this is the most lethal Navy ever, is a self-serving fiction - a pretty illusion, generated by corporatist admirals who have a story to sell.
Here's the choice: Consciously choose a less lethal force – the force as it is, today. Maintain the illusion, because it's comfortable, and only pays the cost in a major war at sea. Or…you can take the hard road and start to enforce the law again: Sexual congress is forbidden aboard ships, squadrons, and submarines. Intimacy between officers, chief petty officers, and enlisted people is forbidden. Sex with persons in your chain of command is misconduct. Take the example of those early Captains who ran a taut ship. You want lethality, this is the cost of lethality. Rigorously enforce the laws in the ship. At the same time, ignore that which happens off the ship – where you cannot enforce the law. Keep it off the ship or face the hard and unyielding consequences.
It comes down to having guts and the courage of conviction. It comes down to doing the job. Either enforce the standards or don't pretend that you have standards. Obese? Out. Drug use? Out. Fraternization? Out. Misconduct that impugns my ability to prepare the ship to fight and win? Out.
The bar has been steadily lowered for misplaced political expediency. It will have to be painfully re-raised because we lost philosophical and moral muscle memory in the name of misplaced pressure and fear. This is not a popularity contest, and one wonders what today's leaders will say when the inevitable scenes of carnage appear. Nothing to see here…move along?
Focus on warfighting. That's why we're here. Body bags are unisex.
Captain Eyer (U.S. Navy, ret.) served as a Surface Warfare Officer for twenty-seven Years. He served in seven cruisers and commanded three Aegis cruisers; USS Thomas S. Gates (CG 51), USS Shiloh (CG 67), and USS Chancellorsville (CG 62).

Innovation Alone Won’t Prepare the U.S. for the Future Battlefield
By Joshua Segal • RealClearDefenseThe sUAS Tactical Trifecta
By Bryan T. Woody • RealClearDefense
The Revolutionary War: When Strategic Options Share the Same Weakness
By Henry Yep • RealClearDefense
The Houthis Are Testing the Limits of Collective Defense
By Saima Afzal • RealClearDefense
Radio Frequencies in the Intelligence Ecosystem
By Craig Brower • RealClearDefense

Who Shoots Down the Drone Over the Shipyard?
By John Ferrari & Dillon Prochnicki • RealClearDefense
Northrop Grumman Breaks Out the Big Guns at AUSA
By Daniel Terrill, Defense News
Army Pursuing Diverse Array of New Anti-Air Interceptors
By Trevithick, The WarZone
Who Shoots Down the Drone Over the Shipyard?
By John Ferrari & Dillon Prochnicki, RCD
F-35C Lands for the First Time on a Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier
By The Aviationist
