India-China: Pressure at Altitude

Even before the shocking events of 15 June, in which at least 20 Indian soldiers died along with an unknown number of their Chinese counterparts, it was clear to some that this year’s shadow boxing on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was different.

What is occurring in the Galwan Valley, however, looks less like another standoff, and more like a seizure of territory comparable to what happened at Kargil in 1999. In that incident, Pakistani troops took India by surprise by moving into the mountains surrounding that town in Kashmir, about 200 kilometres directly west of where the PLA are now encamped, threatening a strategic road. Stung by this undetected intrusion, an embarrassed government in New Delhi ordered the Indian army to expel the Pakistani forces, despite the risk that a war might escalate to a nuclear exchange.

If the Modi government backs off, allowing the PLA to remain at Galwan, public opinion could well turn against it … If the government decides to retaliate in some way, it risks a wider war.

What makes the Galwan Valley episode different from earlier Chinese intrusions across the LAC is that – like the Pakistanis at Kargil – Beijing is insisting that the PLA are there to stay. On 17 June, foreign ministry spokesperson (and prominent “wolf warrior” diplomat) Zhao Lijian declared that “China always owns [sic] sovereignty over the Galwan Valley region” and that if India wants to avoid conflict, it is up to New Delhi to restrain its forces.

Exactly what India can and will do is unclear. It does not help that Narendra Modi’s government has been less than frank with the public about what the PLA have been doing and where they are now present. It had conceded that Chinese patrols have been active around Pangong Tso (or Lake), and elsewhere on the LAC, but was evasive on the bigger intrusion at Galwan, further north. It may be that New Delhi believed that talks between local commanders, using mechanisms for de-escalation agreed in the mid-1990s and regularly used since, would soon defuse the situation and save its blushes.

The 15 June skirmish exposed that approach, forcing the Modi government to admit – albeit tacitly – that the PLA were present in the Galwan Valley. Local level talks may calm the situation on the ground. But if Beijing continues to press its claim to the area, as both the Chinese foreign ministry and state media are doing, and keeps troops there, New Delhi faces some difficult choices.

If the Modi government backs off, allowing the PLA to remain at Galwan, public opinion could well turn against it. Indians are already angry with China over Covid-19, the imbalance of trade between the two countries, and about its “all weather friendship” with Pakistan. To date, Modi has channelled this to his own advantage, orchestrating one-on-one summits with Xi that make it appear like China respects India as a peer, and pointing to his government’s resilience during the 2017 Doklam standoff. Conceding control of the Galwan Valley, even tacitly or temporarily, threatens all of this and Modi’s political authority.

If, on the other hand, the government decides to retaliate in some way, it risks a wider war. Both sides have moved forces to the LAC in recent weeks, to both the western sector, but also to the eastern part. And reports in the last few days suggest New Delhi has ordered the military to step up its preparations on the frontier and at sea, where India’s navy could potentially interdict Chinese ships in the Indian Ocean or the Malacca Strait.

For the moment, it appears that India is willing to talk, with S. Jaishankar, the foreign minister given the job to call his counterpart, Wang Yi. But even if some deal is done, it will probably be temporary.

It is clear that Beijing thinks it has the upper hand and believes the benefits of openly coercing India – and sending messages to others in the region into the bargain – outweigh the costs. It is equally clear that New Delhi will not be dissuaded from deepening its strategic partnerships with the United States and other like-minded countries in the region, including Australia and Japan, to manage China’s increasingly belligerent behaviour. Further clashes between the two, diplomatic and likely military, will come.

Ian Hall is a Professor of International Relations at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Australia, and an Academic Fellow of the Australia India Institute at the University of Melbourne. His most recent book is Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy (2019). 

This article appeared originally at the interpreter.