The Iron Pyrite Standard of Arms Control

The title of this piece[1] was adapted from an article by Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and former Undersecretary of State Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller. Ambassador Antonov was writing not as a private citizen but as a senior official of a hostile foreign government. It contained distortions typical of Russian information operations, claimed that the New START Treaty was "THE GOLD STANDARD" of arms control, and ended with the suggestion that the U.S. government should adopt the Russian position: "Russian President Vladimir Putin has indicated that the Russian side is ready to extend New START without any preconditions. There is nothing stopping U.S. President Donald Trump from immediately announcing the same."^[2] It represented opposition to the Trump administration's quite reasonable approach to bringing China into the negotiation, closing the loopholes in the New START Treaty, and enhancing the inadequate verification regime.

Even the Obama administration did not seek to extend the New START Treaty; rather, in 2013, President Obama proposed to build on New START by negotiating a new agreement that would reduce nuclear forces one-third from the New START level.[7] Toward the end of the Obama administration, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher noted, “Russia remains in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and remains unreceptive to the President’s offer to negotiate further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons below the limits of the New START Treaty.”[8] There is no mystery why Russia wanted to extend New START without changes. Russia got exactly what it wanted in New START – large loopholes to exploit and a dramatic reduction in the START Treaty's verification regime (START I).[9]

Prior to his article with Secretary Gottemoeller, Ambassador Antonov in April 2019 asserted before the Arms Control Association that “…the new nuclear weapons that Mr. Putin has presented recently, I would just like to say [to] you that it’s not subject of this [the New START] treaty.”[10] No one at this meeting challenged his obviously faulty treaty interpretation, which would gut the New START Treaty. Antonov’s statement would exclude from coverage the new Sarmat heavy ICBM, one of Putin’s new nuclear superweapons weapons. In December 2019, Russia announced a large expansion of the planned Sarmat force to 20 regiments of ICBMs, which represents 120-200 deployed missiles and up to 4,000 deployed nuclear warheads.[11]

On occasion, Russia has suggested it would be willing to discuss the inclusion of Putin's nuclear superweapons in the context of the Treaty. In February 2020, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, “We’ve already said that our military is ready to consider at least a part of these weapons, such as Avangard and Sarmat, as subjects of this Treaty.”[12] In May 2020, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said Russia would be willing to discuss Russia’s advanced weapon systems on condition of discussing the American missile shield system in detail.[13] I certainly would not take these Russian statements to the bank (they are likely playing bait and switch, and certainly Russia will try to attach unacceptable conditions).

Secretary Gottemoeller is a controversial figure. Double hatted as Chief Negotiator of the New START Treaty and Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Verification, she had unprecedented authority. Distrust of her developed when she interacted with Senators. A letter signed by over 40 senators challenged her handling of the missile defense issue in New START. The letter reigned her in, but the damage had been done, and the Obama administration continued to falsely claim the New START treaty did not limit missile defense.[14]

There was very strong opposition to her confirmation as Under Secretary of State by Republican Senators. According to the Arms Control Association, 42 Republican Senators voted against her confirmation because of concerns that the Obama administration had “dragged its feet in informing them about Russia’s possible violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.”^[15] It reported that a senior Obama administration official acknowledged the delay but tried "blaming bureaucracy for the delay," saying "the clearance process took longer than I would have liked."[16] This was a rather disingenuous argument. Indeed, three State Department non-compliance reports prepared by Secretary Gottemoeller’s bureau between 2011 and 2013 were quite misleading. All these reports said, “The Parties to the [INF] Treaty last met in the Special Verification Commission in October 2003. There were no issues raised during this reporting period.”[17] The July 2013 Noncompliance report did not even say in a footnoted what the State Department later revealed, that in May 2013, “The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Gottemoeller raises U.S. concerns [with INF treaty compliance] with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabakov.”[18] In January 2014, Michael Gordon, then with The New York Times, reported that we know about the INF Treaty compliance issue in 2011.[19]

Even after Michael Gordon broke the story, confirmed by the State Department, that, “The United States informed its NATO allies this month that Russia had tested a new ground-launched cruise missile, raising concerns about Moscow’s compliance with a landmark arms control accord,”[20] Gottemoeller, then-Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, delivered a speech entitled “Arms Control Priorities in 2014 and Beyond,” which did not say a word about INF Treaty non-compliance or Russian non-compliance in general.[21]

Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas) characterized her track record as one “of prioritizing getting a deal over defending our national security interests”, and said, “…this nomination poses an unacceptable risk in a dangerous time.”[22] There was concern that she supported unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear capability.[23]

The Biden administration’s decision to extend the New START Treaty without changes.[24] This is a bad decision that likely will make it impossible to obtain any future arms control agreements with Russia. If it does and makes the same mistakes the Obama administration made in New START, it will negotiate an unratifiable treaty because of its negative implications for national security.

Secretary Gottemoeller has a record of inaccurately describing the limits contained in the New START Treaty. In September 2017, Secretary Gottemoeller, then the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, stated, “So they [Russia] will be constrained to 500 delivery vehicles, 500 delivery vehicles and no more, and that means 1,550 operationally deployed warheads, no more.”[25] There is no 500 limit on delivery vehicles in the New START Treaty, and it contains no limit at all on

“operationally deployed warheads.” (“Operationally deployed warheads” was the bomber weapon counting rule in the 2002 Moscow Treaty negotiated by the Bush administration.) The three New START Treaty limits, as recently described by the State Department, are 1,550 deployed warheads (with bomber weapons counted a one per aircraft irrespective of how many warheads they can actually carry), 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.[26] According to Colonel General (ret.) Viktor Yesin, former commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Russia wanted 500 deployed delivery vehicles while the U.S. wanted 1,100.[27]

Secretary Gottemoeller has consistently avoided facing the implications of what counting a full bomber load of nuclear cruise missiles (or in the near future hypersonic weapons) under New START as one warhead really is. In 2010, Arms control enthusiast Hans Kristensen of the Federation of the American Scientist said it was “totally nuts” because it “frees up a large pool of warhead spaces under the treaty limit that enable each country to deploy many more warheads than would otherwise be the case…”[28] Russian Major General (ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin pointed out, “Firstly, it [the New START Treaty] does not provide a real reduction of strategic offensive armaments by the number of nuclear warheads as compared with the Moscow Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty [SORT] of 2002 due to the new rules in counting nuclear armaments of heavy bombers: one heavy bomber—one warhead.”[29] For example, the new Russian Tu-160M2 bombers, at least 50 of which are planned, will each count as one nuclear warhead but can carry 12 nuclear missiles.[30] The existing Tu-160s carry the same number, and the Tu-95 Bear can carry between 6 and 16 nuclear missiles.[31] In his 2010 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Under Secretary of State Dr. Robert Joseph concluded that "Because bombers, no matter what they are loaded with, are counted as 'one,' both parties could increase deployed warheads beyond 2,200 [the maximum number of deployed warheads allowed under the 2002 Moscow Treaty].”^[32] Indeed, in 2018, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris estimated that Russia had 2,522 deployed strategic nuclear warheads.[33]

Ambassador Antonov and Secretary Gottemoeller spoke only about the limit on deployed warheads and deployed delivery vehicles. Russia was below both of these limits on the day that the new START Treaty went into effect.[34] Thus, the only reduction in these categories was made by the United States.

Because of the New START Treaty's loopholes, there is no real limit on the number of strategic-range nuclear warheads that can be deployed other than affordability. Four of Putin’s six nuclear superweapons do not count against the New START Treaty limits -- the Poseidon nuclear-powered nuclear-armed drone submarine, the Tsirkon powered hypersonic missile, the Kinzhal hypersonic missile, and the nuclear powered nuclear-armed cruise missile.[35] No cruise missile is numerically limited under New START. Extending New START keeps these loopholes in effect.

There are issues of Russian non-compliance with the New START Treaty. In March 2011, state-run Ria Novosti reported that Russia had “over 400 ICBMs”.[36] On numerous occasions between 2013 and 2017, Colonel General Karakayev stated that the Strategic Missile Force had 400 ICBMs, a much larger number of deployed ICBMs and nuclear warheads than is allowed under the New START Treaty in light of Russian data declarations.[37] In December 2019, Russian state media again reported that "Spread around the country in silos and on truck-mountable containers are about 400 ICBMs, each with multiple nuclear warheads as their payload.”[38] The problem is that Russia can't have more than about 300 deployed ICBMs under its New START Treaty data declarations, which are made public. Colonel General Karakayev’s statements suggest a covert ICBM force, a major New START Treaty violation. We do not monitor the production or the elimination of Russian mobile ICBMs under New START as we did under the original START Treaty. Indeed, there is no New START Treaty limit on non-deployed mobile ICBMs, which creates major cheating and breakout potential.[39]

In December 2018, Colonel General Karakayev said that “…the nuclear potentials of the sides have [been] reduced more than 66% since the signing of START I.”[40] This is a major departure from the normal Russian position. At the United Nations in April 2018, First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the U.N Dmitry Polyanskiy declared that "Russia cut its nuclear arsenal by over 85 percent as compared to its stockpiles at the height of the Cold War."[41] If one uses the reported late Soviet number of over 10,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads for the calculation,[42] the difference between an 85% reduction and a 66% reduction is almost 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads above the supposed New START Treaty allowed level of 1,550. This is only possible if there is Russian cheating, presumably with mobile ICBMs.

In December 2019, Secretary Gottemoeller argued in favor of the extension of the New START Treaty because "…the Russians could rapidly add several hundred more warheads, some say up to a thousand warheads, to their existing deployments of ICBMs without deploying a single additional missile.”[43] (It could be thousands in light of the Sarmat program.) New START is the cause of this problem, not the defense against it. The New START Treaty omitted the original START Treaty's many provisions designed to prevent or limit a Treaty breakout. These include: 1) provisions that limited the number of warheads that could be tested on each type of ICBM and SLBM; 2) a throw-weight (missile payload) limit on the entire strategic missile force; 3) limits on the throw-weight of individual missile types (ICBM sand SLBMs); 4) the near abolition of the New START Treaty requirements regarding the provision of missile telemetry (which provides information on the technical characteristics of missiles); 5) the START Treaty warhead attribution rules; 6) limitations on downloading (reducing the number of accountable warheads); 7) provisions for the monitoring of the number of mobile ICBMs produced; and 8) the prohibition on the creation of “new types” of heavy ICBMs and SLBMs (thus we now face the Sarmat threat).[44]

Article V of the New START Treaty (2010) and Article V of the original START Treaty (1992) have the same function – listing types of weapons systems and capabilities that are prohibited. Article V of the New START has 125 words. Article V of the original START Treaty contains 1,863 words. Thus, the START Treaty prohibitions related to limiting breakout and cheating were completely eliminated from the New START Treaty.

Breakout and cheating are actually the opposite sides of the same coin. The same New START Treaty provisions that facilitate breakout also facilitate cheating, and the New START Treaty verification regime is only a pale reflection of what was in the START Treaty.[45]

In Secretary Gottemoeller’s joint article with Ambassador Antonov and in her later article on the New START Treaty's verification, the effectiveness of the New START verification regime is greatly exaggerated. The sad fact is that no inspection conducted under the New START Treaty can prove a treaty violation as distinct from every inspection conducted under the original START Treaty. As former Under Secretary of State John Bolton observed, “…we have lost important START requirements for on-site inspections, telemetry exchanges, and production monitoring.”[46]

Secretary Gottemoeller states, “New START made good use of what worked in previous treaties, but it did not perpetuate problems encountered in implementing those treaties.”[47] This apparently refers to the elimination in New START of START Treaty provisions the Russians had violated, thus reducing the verification regime. According to the Obama administration, the “most common” Russian violation of the START Treaty involved mobile ICBMs and telemetry provisions;[48] these requirements were nearly eliminated in New START.

The New START Treaty limit of 1,550 deployed warheads is not real and not verifiable with regard to ballistic missile warheads. Even with the full START Treaty verification regime, verifying the number of deployed warheads was difficult.[49] This was made worse by Russian violation of the procedures for warhead inspection. It prevented verification that no more than the allowed number of warheads (reentry vehicles) were deployed on the inspected missiles.[50] In 2010, then-Senator Christopher Bond noted that, “The Select Committee on Intelligence has been looking at this issue closely over the past several months. As the vice chairman of this committee, I have reviewed the key intelligence on our ability to monitor this Treaty and heard from our intelligence professionals. There is no doubt in my mind that the United States cannot reliably verify the Treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed warheads."[51] He pointed out that since any missile under New START could carry any number of warheads, and the number of missile inspections was very low (10 per year), there was no way to prove a violation. Secretary Gottemoeller defends the elimination of START Treaty attribution rules, which provided accountable warhead numbers for each type of missile, claiming New START's "streamlined procedures…make inspections reliable in confirming information that the Russians provide to the United States…”[52] This may be true for the inspection of ten missiles, but it prevents any inspection from being able to prove a Treaty violation (Russian deployment of over 1,550 accountable warheads) because of the absence of attribution rules (i.e., any observed deployed missiles is automatically counted as a specific number of warheads). Without attribution rules, National Technical Means of Verification can’t count the total number of warheads accountable on Russian missiles. Moreover, it is possible to verify the warhead numbers even on the inspected missiles only if the Russians do not violate verification procedures in the manner they did under the START Treaty. Former Assistant Secretary of State Paula De Sutter has pointed out:

The New START treaty's verification measures add nothing to what was there

before in the original START treaty. They are using the original START Reentry Vehicle

On-Site Inspection regime, complete with all of the same shrouds and covers that were

used during the original START, some of which we found to violate the Treaty because

we couldn't confirm the number of Reentry Vehicles (R.V.s). And those are all still

permitted.[53]

Russian cheating with covert mobile ICBMs is facilitated by the fact that the New START Treaty omitted almost the entire START Treaty verification regime for mobile ICBMs.[54] Most significantly, permanent on-site monitoring of mobile ICBM production was omitted. Even with the comprehensive START Treaty verification regime, the Senate Select Committee report on the monitoring of the START Treaty concluded that "… U.S. intelligence will have less than high confidence in its monitoring of such areas as non-deployed mobile ICBMs…."[55] If we can’t verify the number of deployed mobile ICBMs, we can’t verify the number of deployed warheads.

Ambassador Antonov and Secretary Gottemoeller put a lot of emphasis on the number of notifications made under the New START Treaty, specifically mentioning “a missile is going to a maintenance facility…” They don't tell the reader that maintenance facilities were dropped from the list of inspectable facilities in New START or that the number of notifications under New START was dramatically reduced compared to the original START Treaty. Russian Major General (ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin noted the reduction in the number of notifications was from 152 under START to 42 under New START, and the number of inspections was reduced from 28 to 18.[56] 

Telemetry is the diagnostic measurements that are broadcast from ballistic missiles during flight

testing. Access to unencrypted telemetry from ballistic missile test flights was one of the

START Treaty's key achievements. According to Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov, we “exchange telemetry from a selection of missiles launched on an annual basis.”[57] The truth is that we went from the exchange of telemetry from every launch in the START Treaty to up to five a year in the New START Treaty, and by a subsequent agreement (under Gottemoeller’s watch), the exchange was limited to one launch a year.[58] Former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Wolsey has recognized the fact that New START made it "free to encrypt telemetry" and that this was one of the key verification problems in the Treaty.[59] Moreover, the Russian resolution of ratification prohibits providing telemetry of any modern system. The Heritage Foundation has accurately summed up the provisions for the original START Treaty (START I) telemetry and compared them to those in New START:

The START I Treaty required the broadcast of telemetry from every flight test and the provision of telemetry tapes and interpretive data from every flight test. In contrast, New START requires telemetry from at most five flight tests per year. Agreement on the precise number of telemetry exchanges and for which flight tests telemetry will be provided will occur in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Moscow will be free to determine which of its flight tests it will select to meet this goal. The Russians are likely to provide telemetry data on Russia's aging missiles' flight tests rather than from its development tests of new ICBMs and SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles).

The START I Treaty contained very strong restrictions on the encryption of telemetry. These have been eliminated for New START. Thus, it is clearly legal to encrypt all telemetry for every flight test for which a party does not intend to provide telemetry tapes. This is very likely to be the case for all flight tests for new development or modern Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. Our understanding of the new and modified Russian missiles is, therefore, likely to decline dramatically over time. This will have profound implications.[60]

The New START Treaty is the worst arms control Treaty negotiated since the 1970s. It is not a viable base tor a new agreement. The reductions in deployed warheads and delivery systems mandated by the Treaty were entirely by the U.S. The Treaty is loaded with loopholes that Russia is exploiting, and the verification regime was seriously degraded. According to press reports, “When Putin raised the possibility of extending the 2010 treaty, known as New START, [President] Trump paused to ask his aides in an aside what the Treaty was, these sources said. Trump then told Putin the treaty “was one of several bad deals negotiated by the Obama administration, saying that New START favored Russia.”[61] He was correct. There are very serious implications of this for future negotiations with Russia.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served in a number of senior positions within the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy including Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions.  He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

[1] Iron pyrite is commonly called fool’s gold.

[2] Anatoly Antonov and Rose Gottemoeller, “Keeping Peace in the Nuclear Age -- Why Washington and Moscow Must Extend the New START Treaty,” Foreign Affairs, April 29, 2020, available at https://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/united-states/2020-04-29/keeping-peace-nuclear-age.

[3] “New START extension enters into force.” TASS, February 3, 2021, available at https://tass.com/politics/1252323.

[4] Robert Burns, “Renewed US-Russia nuke pact won't fix emerging arms threats,” The Telegraph, January 28, 2021, available at https://www.thetelegraph.com/news/article/Renewed-US-Russia-nuke-pact-won-t-fix-emerging-15904188.php.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Stephanie Nebehay, “Biden to pursue arms control, seeks to engage China: U.S. envoy,” Reuters, February 4, 2021, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-newstart-idUSKBN2A417F.

[7] Roberta Rampton, Stephen Brown, “Obama challenges Russia to agree to deeper nuclear weapon cuts,” Reuter’s June 19, 2013, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-berlin-nuclear/obama-challenges-russia-to-agree-to-deeper-nuclear-weapon-cuts-idUSBRE95J01K20130620.

[8] Statement of Robert Scher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces March 2, 2016, p. 3, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings /AS/AS29/20160302/104619/HHRG-114-AS29-Wstate-ScherR-20160302.pdf.

[9] “New START Working Group, “An Independent Assessment of the New START Treaty,” The Heritage Foundation, April 30, 2010, available at http://www.heritageorg/Research/Reports/2010/04/An-Independent -Assessment-of-New-START-Treaty.: “New START: Potemkin Village Verification,” (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, June 24, 20100, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/new-start-potemkin-villageverification?query=New+START: +Potemkin+Village+Verification.

[10] “New Risks and New Arms Control Solutions: North Korea, Disruptive Technologies, and the New Arms Race,” Arms Control Association, April 15, 2019, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/armscontrol2019.: “Russia’s new strategic weapons don’t fall under limits of New START Treaty, says envoy,” TASS, April 15, 2019, available at http://tass.com/defense/1053781.

[11] Mark B Schneider, “Russian Modernization of Its ICBM Force,” Real Clear Defense, April 23, 2020, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/04/23/russianmodernizationofitsicbmforce115224.html.

[12] “Russia/Iran/United States: FM: Russia Ready to Extend New START Arms Control Treaty, Negotiate on New Weapons, Yet US Ignores Offers,” Asia News Monitor, February 11, 2020, available at https://dialog.Proquest .com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/2352675678/fulltext/16FD941B9FF2478E747/13?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=16FD941B9FF2478E747/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone17073c0965b.

[13] "Russia to discuss its new weapon systems only along with U.S. missile shield says diplomat," TASS, May 22, 2020, available at https://tass.com/defense/1159453.

[14] Keith Payne, “Evaluating the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Deal,” The Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2010, available at http: //nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/WSJ%20Payne%20Article%20April%202010.pdf.

[15] Tom Z. Collina, “Gottemoeller Confirmed by Senate,” Arms Control Association, no date, available at https:// www.armscontrol.org/act/2014-04/gottemoeller-confirmed-senate.

[16] Ibid.

[17] “Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, July 12, 2013), available at https://2009-2017. state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2013/211884.htm.

[18] U.S. Department of State, “Timeline of Highlighted U.S. Diplomacy Regarding the INF Treaty Since 2013,” Fact Sheet, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, July 30, 2019), available at https://www.state. gov/timeline-of-highlighted-u-s-diplomacy-regarding-the-inf-treaty-since-2013/.

[19] Michael Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty,” The New York Times, January 29, 2014,

available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-missile-despite-treaty.html.

[20] Ibid.: Jen Psaki Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, January 30, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/01/221045.htm.

[21] Rose Gottemoeller, “Arms Control Priorities in 2014 and Beyond,” Exchange Monitor’s Sixth Annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit Arlington, VA February 14, 2014, available https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/us/2014/221662.htm.

[22] “Cruz: On the nomination of Rose Gottemoeller to be Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,” Chron.com, March 6, 2014, available at https://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pearland/ opinion/article/ Cruz-On-the-nomination-of-Rose-Gottemoeller-to-9945152.php.

[23] “GOP Senators Press Gottemoeller on Prospect of Unilateral Arms Control,” National Journal, September 26, 2013, available at https://www.yahoo.com/news/gop-senators-press-gottemoeller-prospect-unilateral-arms-control-010204256--politics.html.

[24] “New START extension enters into force,” TASS, February 3, 2021, available at https://tass.com/politics/1252323.

[25] “Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller at the panel discussion ‘Global nuclear governance: Quo Vadis?’' at the Bled Strategic Forum (BSF), Slovenia,” NATO, September 5, 2017, available at

http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_146617.htm?selectedLocale=en.

[26] U.S. Department of State, “New START,” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, no date), available at https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm.

[27] Mark B. Schneider, New START: The Anatomy of a Failed Negotiation, (Fairfax Va.: National Institute Press,

July 2012), p. 45, available at http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/New-start.pdf.

[28] Peter Baker, “Arms Control May Be Different on Paper and on the Ground,” The New York Times, March 30, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/world/europe/31start.html.

[29] “New START Enables Russia To Keep Nuclear Balance with U.S.,” Interfax AVN, December 23, 2010, available

at http://business.highbeam.com/407705/article-1G1-245176770/new-start-enables-russia.

[30] Ibid.: “PAK DA's Precursor, Russian Tu-160M2 Bomber to Get Universal Anti-Missile Shield,” Sputnik News, January 21, 2017, available at https://sputniknews.com/military/201701211049858468-tu-160m2-missile-defense-pak-da/.; Marissa Papatola, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START,” Arms Control Association,  March 12, 2018, available at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Russian-Strategic-Nuclear-Forces-Under-New-START.

[31] Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda, “United States nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 13, 2020, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701286.

[32] “THE NEW START TREATY (TREATY DOC. 111–5) HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION APRIL 29, MAY 18, 19, 25, JUNE 10, 15, 16, 24, AND JULY 15, 2010,” p. 357, available at http: //foreign.senate.gov/treaties/details/?id=1668ace8-5056-a032-526a-29c8fc32e1dc.

[33] Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, “Russian nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April

30, 2018, p. 186, available at https://thebulletin.org/2018/05/russian-nuclear-forces-2018/.

[34] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Russian and U.S. Strategic Offensive Arms (Fact Sheet)," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 27, 2011, available at http://www.mid. ru/brp_4.nsf/0/55016EBF86 9728C1C32578BD0058B349.: U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” U.S. Department of State, June 1, 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/164722.htm.

[35] “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” Kremlin.ru, March 1, 2018, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/ events/president/news/56957.: “Presidential Address to Federal Assembly,” Kremlin.ru, February 20, 2019, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863.; Joe Gould, “U.S. nuclear general worries over Russia's weapons outside New START,” Defense News, February 28, 2019, available at https://www.Defensen ews.com/smr/nucleararsenal/2019/02/26/us-nuclear-general-worries-over-russias- weapons-outside-new-start/.; “US State Department Says Russia's Sarmat ICBM, Avangard Would be Subject to New START,” Sputnik, May 15, 2019, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnew sstand/docview/2225164993/fulltext/ 16A3BBC046B4F382BD7/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=16A3BBC046B4F382BD7/1&t:cp= maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone16ad63acf70.

[36] “Russia to develop new ballistic missile system by 2013,” Ria Novosti, March 17, 2011, available at http://en.rian. ru/mlitarynews/20110317/163056088.htmlsti.

[37] “Some 400 ICBMs are on combat duty in Russia – RVSN commander,” Interfax, December 16, 2014, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/1636603843/fulltext/1774F69FBFD2DCB0819/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=1774F69FBFD2DCB0819/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_177e9e8cdbb.: “Russian Strategic Missile Troops have about 400 ICBM launchers – commander,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, December 17, 2013, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/docview/1468597532?accountid=155509.; “Russia’s RVSN has some 400 ICBMs on duty – commander,” Interfax, December 15, 2016, https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/profession alnewsstand/docview/1849162981/fulltext/1774F6BE0B94A489D03/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=1774F6BE0B94A489D03/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_177e9eaafd8.;  “Ordnance; Russian Strategic Missile Forces comprise approx. 400 ICBMs – commander.” Interfax, December 17, 2017, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/ 1963335174/fulltext/17078CBBA9F16F6BAD1/1?Accountid =155509 &site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac =17078CBBA9F16 F6BAD1/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitation blocksbrief&t: zoneid=transactionalZone_ 171134a8a8a.; Mark Schneider, “Russian Violations of the INF and New START Treaties,” Information Series Issue No. 410 (Washington D.C.: Natioanl Institute for Public Policy, August 15, 2016), available at http://www.nipp.org/2016/08/15/schneider-mark-russian-violations-of-the-infand-new-start-treaties/.; “Russian Strategic Missile Force armed with about 400 ballistic missiles — Defense Ministry,” TASS, December 15, 2016, available at http://tass.com/defense/919518.; “Army; Russian Strategic Missile Forces comprise approx. 400 ICBMs – commander, Interfax, November 13, 2017, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/ professional/professional newsstand/docview/1963796939/fulltext/17078CBBA9F16F6BAD1/2?Accountid =155509&site=professional newsstand&t:ac=17078C BBA9F16F6BAD1/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks brief&t:zoneid=transactional Zone_1711354130f.

[38] “World’s end at their fingertips: Russian troops in charge of ground-launched ICBMs celebrate 60th anniversary,” R.T., December 17, 2018, available at https://www.rt.com/search?q=400+RVSN&type=.

[39] Schneider, New START: The Anatomy of a Failed Negotiation, op. cit. p. 10, 16, 34.

[40] “U.S. to seek ways of leveling capacities of Russian strategic nuclear forces - Gen. Karakayev,” Interfax, December 17, 2018, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/215783 3980/fulltext/170A12F3A8169524B30/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=170A12F3A8169524B30/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone1713bae0b2d.

[41] "Statement by Mr. Dmitry Polyanskiy, First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the U.N., during General Debate at the U.N. Disarmament Commission 2018," Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, April 2, 2018, available at http://russiaun.ru/en/news/desarm0204.

[42] “FACTBOX – Strategic Missile Forces Day in Russia,” Sputnik, December 17, 2018, available at https://dialog .proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/2157472585/fulltext/170A13075F1754EEEB6/1? accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=170A1307 5F1754EEEB6/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcit ationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_1713baf472d.

[43] “US May Lose Nuclear Parity With Russia Without START - Ex-NATO Deputy Chief,” Sputnik, December 6, 2019, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professional newsstand/docview/2321933850/

fulltext/16E4CBE4E1D213FDCE5/3?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=16E4CBE4E 1D213FDCE5/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_16ee73d1b23.

[44] “New START: Potemkin Village Verification,” op. cit.: Senator Christopher Bond, “The New START Treaty.” The Congressional Record, November 18, 2010, available at http: /www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r 111:34:./temp/ ~r111MwN34p.; James Woolsey, “Old Problems with New START,” Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2010, available at http://www.sroblog.com/2010/11/15/r-james-woolsey-old-problems - with-new-start-wsj/.; Schneider, New START: The Anatomy of a Failed Negotiation, op. cit., pp. 5-9, 12.

[45] Mark B. Schneider, “Russia Nuclear Breakout and the New START Treaty,” Real Clear Defense, January 14, 2020, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/01/14/russianuclearbreakoutandthenew start _treaty_114973.html.

[46] John R. Bolton, “A Treaty for Utopia,” National Review Online, May 3, 2010, available at http://article.national

review.com/431722/a-treaty-for-utopia/john-r-bolton?page=4.

[47] Ibid.

[48] “The New START Treaty (Treaty Doc. 111–5),” op. cit., p. 262.

[49] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE START TREATY,” (Washington D.C.: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 29, 1992), p. 3, available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/102431. pdf.

[50] Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, August 2005), pp 12-13, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/ rpt/c15720.htm.

[51] Bond, “The New START Treaty.” op. cit.

[52] Gottemoeller, “The New START verification regime: How good is it?”, op. cit.

[53] Paula DeSutter, “Verification and the New START Treaty,” (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, July 12, 2010, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/verification-and-the-new-start-treaty.

[54] “New START: Potemkin Village Verification,” op. cit.

[55] “CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE START TREATY,” op cit., p. 3.

[56] Cited in Schneider, New START: The Anatomy of a Failed Negotiation, op. cit., p. iii.

[57] Antonov and Gottemoeller, “Keeping Peace in the Nuclear Age -- Why Washington and Moscow Must Extend the New START Treaty,” op. cit.

[58] “ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW START TREATY,” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2013) p. p 5, available at January 2013), p. 5, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/ documents/organization/212101.pdf.

[59] R. James Woolsey, “Old Problems with New START,” Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2010, available at http://www. sroblog.com/2010/11/15/r-james-woolsey-old-problems-with-new-start-wsj/.

[60] “New START: Potemkin Village Verification,” op. cit.

[61] Jonathan Landay and David Rohde, "Exclusive: In a call with Putin, Trump denounced Obama-era nuclear arms treaty – sources," Reuters, February 9, 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-putin/ exclusive-in-call-with-putin-trump-denounced-obama-era-nuclear-arms-treaty-sources-idUSKBN15O2A5.