Recent Developments in Russian Nuclear Forces

In December 2023, in his annual speech before the Russian Defense Ministry Board, President Vladimir Putin stated that, “Given the changing nature of military threats and the emergence of new military and political risks, the role of the nuclear triad, which ensures the balance of power, the strategic balance of power in the world, has significantly increased.” According to the Putin regime’s mythology, recently echoed in state-run Sputnik News, it is only Russia’s strategic nuclear forces that “Saved Russia From Being Erased From [the] World Map.”

When he invaded Ukraine in February 2022, President Putin threatened NATO should it intervene against Russia, stating that Russia would respond “…immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history. No matter how the events unfold, we are ready. All the necessary decisions in this regard have been taken. I hope that my words will be heard.” Most current Russian nuclear threats associated with Putin’s aggression against Ukraine have been aimed at the United States and NATO. Russian nuclear threats are designed at deterring Western assistance to Ukraine. Indeed, they have been successful in limiting the scope of Western assistance.

Russia has the lowest nuclear weapons use threshold in the world. Putin’s June 2020 decree on nuclear deterrence states:

The conditions specifying the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation are as follows:

a) arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies;

b) use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies;

c) attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions;

d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

In September 2014, General of the Army (ret.) Yuriy Baluyevskiy, who developed the 2010 revision of Russia’s nuclear doctrine when he was Deputy Secretary of the Russian National Security Council, stated that the “…conditions for pre-emptive nuclear strikes…is contained in classified policy documents.”[1]

Since at least 2003, Russian nuclear doctrine involves an “escalate to de-escalate” or an “escalate to win” strategy. In fact, Russia routinely practices nuclear escalation in its nuclear exercises.[2]

Recognition that Russia is further enhancing its reliance nuclear weapons is clear in the Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI’s) 2023 “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community” which provides a stark warning about the Russian nuclear threat. It states:

The Biden Administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy recognized that, “Our competitors and potential adversaries are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons. By the 2030s, the United States for the first time will need to deter two major nuclear powers, each of

whom will field modern and diverse global and regional nuclear forces.” Moreover, it continued, “Russia’s conventional military will have been weakened, which will likely increase Moscow’s reliance on nuclear weapons in its military planning.”

In December 2023, President Putin announced that, “This year, thanks to the consistent implementation of the state armament programme and the efficient operation of the defence industry enterprises, the level of modern weapons and equipment in the strategic nuclear forces as a whole has reached 95 percent, and the naval component – almost 100 percent.” This is an increase from 91.3% a year before. The comparable U.S. number is zero. Putin said that in 2023 Russia had added a new Borei-A class ballistic missile submarine (the 7^th Borei submarine) and 15 Yars ICBMs and Avangard hypersonic missiles. (Defense Minister and General of the Army Sergei Shoigu noted that the Russian “Strategic Missile Forces have completed the rearmament of the modern Avangard missile system…” This is presumably a reference to the second regiment.) Putin also said, “The aviation component is also being upgraded. In particular, four Tu-160M missile carriers have arrived. We must continue to maintain the combat readiness of strategic forces at the highest level. All plans approved in this area will certainly be implemented.”

In a December 2023 interview conducted by Red Star, Colonel General Sergei Karakayev, Commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (the ICBM force) stated that their modernization had reached 88%. He said that “The current state of the missile forces is characterized by high readiness to perform tasks. The capabilities of the armaments, military, and special equipment are increasing.” Karakayev also indicated that Russia now had the world’s most modern nuclear weapons. He announced that there would be seven ICBM tests in 2024. (In January 2024, the Russian Defense Ministry confirmed this and compared it to 20 launches over the last five years.) A number of the 2024 launches are likely to be the new Sarmat heavy ICBM. Colonel General Karakayev also said that silo-based RS-24 Yars ICBMs carried more warheads than the mobile versions. I will return to this later, but it is significant.

At the December 2023 Defense Ministry Board meeting, General Shoigu said that in 2024, “The Strategic Missile Forces will complete the task of putting the Sarmat strategic missile system on full combat alert. Two Tu-160M strategic missile carriers will join the Strategic Air Forces. The Knyaz Pozharsky nuclear-powered submarine cruiser of Borei-A project, three submarines and 11 surface ships will join the Navy.”

Putin announced that another Borei missile submarine (number 8) would become operational in 2024. In December 2023, Mikhail Budnichenko, CEO of the Sevmash Shipyard, told TASS that, “In the coming years, another three strategic submarines of Borey-A class have to be floated and handed over to the Navy in the framework of the state arms program.” This confirms previous press reports that Russia is going beyond the ten announced Borey submarines. In January 2024, Sputnik News reported that, “Russia expects to receive a complement of 12 Borei subs total by 2031…”[3] The notional availability date for the first new U.S. Columbia class ballistic missile submarine is also 2031 but it is behind schedule.

Russia is reportedly developing a new replacement for the Bulava-30 SLBM, currently deployed on the Borey SSBNs.

Contrary to Russian practice for the last five years in the Defense Board meetings, neither Putin nor Shoigu announced the number of ICBMs to be deployed in 2024. Colonel General Karakayev said Russia has now completed the deployment of mobile MIRVed RS-24/Yars ICBMs (replacing all Soviet-era SS-25s) but that the silo-based Yars deployment will continue.[4]

Russia is continuing the development of the nuclear-capable PAK DA stealth bomber. In December 2023, its developer, the Tupolov design bureau, announced that “…specialists have carried out the full cycle of research and development and experimental design work for creating a testing base and set of test benches.” Sputnik News, Russian state media, reported that, “The PAK-DA is meant in part to replace the Tu-95 – the long-time workhorse of Soviet and Russian aviation which goes back all the way to the 1950s, and the Tu-160 – the late-Soviet era variable sweep wing strategic bomber which proved so successful that production of a modernized variant was recently restarted. It reported that the PAK DA has a 12,000-15,000 mile operational range and a 30 ton payload, which “will be able to carry an array of existing long-range Russian air-launched missiles, cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons, and be future-proofed to be able to deploy new munitions as they become available.” (Emphasis in the original.)

In the next year or two when the Sarmat becomes operational, there will be an explosive increase in Russian strategic nuclear warhead potential. Irrespective of whether this is in 2024 or in 2025, the long-term effects will be the same. The frequent reports of 10-15 warheads for the Sarmat actually refer to the early concept for the missile which had half the launch weight of the 200-ton version that was actually developed. The 200-ton Sarmat makes no sense in the context of an arms control-limited force. The Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) said that the “…‘Sarmat’ will be able to carry up to 20 warheads of small, medium, high power classes.” The increase in the throw-weight from the 1979 vintage SS-18 Mod 4 to the Sarmat is consistent with the Russian MoD’s claim of 20 warheads for the Sarmat. Russian statements about their plans for the Sarmat range from 46 to 120 or more deployed launchers.^[5] In addition to normal ballistic warheads, the Sarmat can carry several Avangard hypersonic gliders and it has an orbital strike capability. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General Anthony Cotton confirmed its orbital capability even hinting it might go beyond a “partial” orbital capability. Multiple orbital capability facilitates surprise EMP attacks.

In the last few years, Russia has revealed the existence of several new ICBM programs beyond the Sarmat. Russia is continuing the old Soviet policy of starting a follow-on system once a new missile is deployed. Just announced is a follow-on for the Bulava-30 SLBM now being deployed on Borei-A submarines. Eventually there will likely be the improved Husky (Arktur) missile submarine with new nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles.

How many nuclear weapons does Russia have? The U.S. government has been silent on this issue since 2012. I have recently completed a National Institute for Public Policy paper on this subject. If one does a Google search on the number of Russia’s nuclear weapons one would be informed that Russia has 5,887 or 5,977 nuclear weapons. However, no one outside of the Russian Defense and Atomic Energy Ministries knows with confidence the exact number of Russian nuclear weapons. Everything else are estimates. There are a number of higher estimates, but they are usually completely ignored in almost all press commentary.

The 5,889 (2023) and the 5,977 (2022) numbers come from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), a left-of-center Washington think tank that does not support U.S. nuclear modernization or the nuclear Triad. The FAS supports what it calls “minimal deterrence” which is defined as: 1) reducing the number of U.S. nuclear warheads to 500, 2) reducing the yield of U.S. nuclear warheads to 3-10 kilotons, 3) eliminating all U.S. counterforce capability, and 4) eliminating the entire U.S. ballistic missile submarine force. The FAS numbers are almost completely undocumented. I believe that for nearly all of the FAS numbers there are no available sources that support them. They are at the low end of existing estimates. In particular, Russian estimates are frequently much higher. For example, in 2021, Pavel Felgenhauer wrote, “Indeed, taking into account non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, which no one has ever verifiably counted, Russia may have more (maybe twice as many overall) than all the other official or unofficial nuclear powers taken together.”

In December 2017, Bill Gertz reported, “Russia is aggressively building up its nuclear forces and is expected to deploy a total force of 8,000 warheads by 2026 along with modernizing deep underground bunkers, according to Pentagon officials. The 8,000 warheads will include both large strategic warheads and thousands of new low-yield and very low-yield warheads to circumvent arms treaty limits and support Moscow’s new doctrine of using nuclear arms early in any conflict.” In August 2019, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters Rear Admiral (ret.) Peter Fanta confirmed the Gertz story stating that, “The Russians are going to 8,000 plus warheads.”^[6] In an analysis published in September 2019, James R. Howe, Vice President of Vision Centric, said that the planned Russian strategic nuclear force could carry between “2,976 WHs [warheads], and a maximum of 6,670 WHs” plus over 800 bomber weapons.

All of these estimates predate the end of New START Treaty on-site inspections in March 2020. The New START Treaty verification regime is very poor. It is critically dependent on Treaty on-site inspections. Given Russian violations of the New START Treaty, its illegal “suspension” in 2022 of the Treaty and the end of New START Treaty data notifications, the upload of most or even all of Russian strategic nuclear forces could have happened. None of this is taken into account in the existing estimates of the size of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. The Biden Administration’s conclusion that that, “Russia did not engage in significant activity above the Treaty limits in 2022” is little more than wishful thinking.

In light of Russia’s attitude toward nuclear weapons, it has every incentive to exploit the opportunity provided by the lack of on-site inspections and its suspension of the New START Treaty.

Even prior to these developments there were many reports of Russian violations of the New START Treaty. These violations involved the deployment of long-range nuclear cruise missiles on fighters and Backfire bombers and repeated statements by Colonel General Karakayev that Russia had more ICBMs than it could possibly have if it was in compliance with the New START Treaty. Since Russia was almost at the New START Treaty limit of 1,550 deployed warheads (it declared 1,549 accountable warheads in September 2022) several times as many missiles than the 31 deployed in 2023 would have to have been downloaded to stay within New START Treaty limits. There is unlikely to be any evidence of this absent on-site treaty inspections.

Colonel General Karakayev’s statement that mobile Yars ICBMs were deployed with less warheads than the silo based Yars is very interesting. Such warhead allocation enhances strategic counterforce capability under New START Treaty limitations. This is the opposite of what a nation would do if it is worried about the survivability of its strategic forces. However, it has the effect of allowing rapid and covert upload and download of its ICBMs which otherwise would likely take much longer for its SLBMs and bombers.

The Biden Administration is maintaining the illusion that U.S. national security can be advanced by a new nuclear arms control agreement with Russia. The latest Biden Administration nuclear arms control proposal was rejected almost immediately by the Putin regime. As the recent report of the United States Strategic Posture Commission recognized: 1) “…there is no prospect of a meaningful arms control Treaty being negotiated with Russia in the foreseeable future…”; 2) “Over the past 20 years, Russia has either violated or has failed to comply with nearly every major arms control treaty or agreement to which the United States is or was a party.”; and 3) “…given Russia’s history of noncompliance and illegal treaty suspensions, and China’s continued intransigence on arms control dialogue, the United States cannot develop its strategic posture based on the assumption that arms control agreements are imminent or will always be in force.”

Russia’s arsenal of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons is vastly larger than that of the United States and includes the full scope of Soviet-era tactical nuclear capabilities. The usual estimate of 2,000 Russian vs. 200 for the United States probably dramatically understates the scope of the Russian advantage. The Russian claim of a 75% reduction since the end of the Cold War results in the retention of 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons or about 25 times the reported U.S. number. There are even higher estimates of the Russian arsenal. Russia is in the process of creating a non-strategic hypersonic nuclear missile Triad.

In December 2023, President Putin declared that his war against Ukraine would ensure Russia’s “global sovereignty.” Putin has a record of making expansive statements about the meaning of Russian sovereignty, but this formulation is apparently unprecedented and particularly ominous.

In paragraph 4 of Putin’s decree on nuclear deterrence, Russian sovereignty is linked to nuclear weapons use. Putin now denies any intent to attack NATO. Yet the Putin regime said the same thing for months prior to its brutal 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov even denies that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an “invasion.” It is still possible that Russia will use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. The United States and NATO are doing almost nothing to deter nuclear escalation.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

[1] “Russia classifies information on pre-emptive nuclear strikes – military,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, September 5, 2014, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professional newsstand/docview/. 1560021754/fulltext/17EE0756B6D35B395AE/1?accountid=155509&accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=17EE0756B6D35B395AE/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_3a53fe1b0b25b4.

[2] “S Armed Services Hearing on Worldwide Threats,” Political Transcript Wire, May 23, 2017, available at https:/ /dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/1902238886/fulltext/1738266AFAE364AFE88/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=1738266AFAE364AFE88/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone1741ce58604.

[3] “Russia may deploy uprated Bulava-M missile at sea – source,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, August 1, 2023, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/2844013214/fulltext /18C5EEEE68A6D7894B9/1?accountid=155509&accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=18C5EEEE68A6D7894B9/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_c81d340383ebec.

[4] “Russia: Russia to unveil Yars ICBM mobile launcher at Army 2023 arms show,” Asia News Monitor, August 11, 2023, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/2848462884/fulltext /18C31716DBC178A2394/1?accountid=155509&accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=18C31716DBC178A2394/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_c568be2eec63fe.

[5] “Testing of Sarmat Intercontinental Missile to be over in 2021 - Russian Defense Management Center,” ITAR-TASS, December 24, 2019, available at https://on-demand-eastviewcom.mutex.gmu.edu/browse/doc/56709629 .State-run Ria Novosti also reported 20 planned regiments of the Sarmat. “Highlights of Russia's Arms Procurement Programme for 2018-2027,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, December 30, 2019, available at https:// infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/documentview?p=WORLDNEWS&docref=news/ 17828B4 D147ABCA0.

[6] “082319 Crane Naval Submarine Warfare Center Symposium on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Modernization and Hypersonics with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matter Peter Fanta,” mimeo.