China: Xi, the Party, and the Endless Struggle

Chinese President Xi Jinping, front row center, stands with his cadres during the Communist song at the closing ceremony for the 19th Party Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Oct. 24, 2017. China's ruling Communist Party is holding its twice-a-decade national congress starting Sunday, Oct. 16, 2022. That's where President Xi Jinping is expected to receive a third five-year term as the uncontested head of the party, government and military of the world's second-largest economy. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan, File)

The Party may be presented as the beacon for the Chinese nation and its people, but Xi warned its members can be a source of the Party’s weakness. He spoke at great length about maintaining vigilance against corruption within the Party: “As long as the breeding grounds and conditions for corruption still exist, we must keep sounding the bugle and never rest, not even for a minute, in our fight against corruption.”

The rule of the Party and its continued control is in part dependent on it adopting a people-centred approach to all aspects of China’s development. Putting people at the heart of development and in the Party’s thinking is no longer about incorporating a variety of stakeholders in the policy consultation process. Social policy initiatives, once the realm of local level innovation with contributions that included civil society have now shifted to the political realm. Organisations that are affiliated with the Party-state are much more likely to be contracted to deliver social and welfare services. Whether tied to the Party or not, civil society stakeholders are no longer part of the policy design, they are now given the job of collecting information and channelling it upwards.

This political control is paired with a continuation of the reform rhetoric that has characterised China’s four decades of “opening up and reform”. Xi’s report to the Congress noted the significance of continuing to deepen reform across all aspects Chinese society and economy, but claimed this must be people-centred.

This development philosophy includes the need to further improve China’s “multi-tiered social security system”. The theme was present five years ago in Xi’s report to the 19th Congress and again echoed in his speech to the CCP’s Central Committee in February 2021, where the Political Bureau of the Central Committee is given the role to evaluate and reform China’s social security system for “improving public wellbeing, safeguarding social fairness, and enhancing people’s welfare”.

China’s growth model, one funded by debt, is unsustainable. Thus, the emphasis must now shift. This requires unleashing “the tremendous creativity of the Chinese people in their hundreds of millions” and tap into the energy of the Chinese youth. But make no mistake, the Party is central to all of this.

As Xi notes, this cannot happen without equipping the youth with “the Party’s theories, inspire them with the Party’s original aspiration and founding mission”.

As the Congress draws to a close, Xi has sought to clearly lay out the work and challenges for the Party. This is not a time to rest, was his message. Challenges to China’s rejuvenation will come from both within and external to the country. The Party’s second centenary will be one of struggle.

Jennifer Hsu is a Research Fellow in the Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Program. She is currently working on a project which explores the intersections of Australia’s multiculturalism and foreign policy. Prior to joining the Institute, Jennifer was a Policy Analyst with China Matters. After completing her PhD at the University of Cambridge in Development Studies, she researched and taught in development studies, political science and sociology in universities in North America and the UK. Jennifer is also a Visiting Fellow at the Social Policy and Research Centre at the University of New South Wales. Her research expertise broadly covers state-society relations, state-NGO relations, civil society and the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs, and she has published widely in these areas.

This article appeared originally at Lowy Institute's the interpreter.