
Strengthening Central Asian Security
Published April 11, 2020 • Read time: 6m
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0Central Asia lives in a dangerous neighborhood. It is situated between two resurgent empires: Russia and China. It includes Afghanistan in its borders, and despite the February 29 agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban, the Taliban broke the treaty within 72 hours. Therefore, Central Asian governments are all conducting what has been called a multi-vector foreign policy to balance between Moscow, Beijing, the EU in Brussels, Washington, and other players like Japan, South Korea, and India. The new U.S. strategy for Central Asia, also issued in February, recognizes this strategic challenge in Central Asia and postulates support for these states’ sovereignty and independence as a primary goal of that strategy.
For these reasons, it is understandable that during Secretary of State Pompeo’s January 2020 visit to the region and in the talks of other high-ranking diplomats with local governments security and security cooperation featured prominently on their agendas. Even though the Coronavirus crisis will temporarily force other issues to the top of their agenda, we can be sure they will not forget about their security. The confluence of these trends has therefore galvanized policymakers to see the region of Central Asia in a new light and to realize that there are both threats to U.S. interests here beyond terrorism and also opportunities to advance our interests, particularly as regards economics, security assistance, reforms in governance, and support for greater regional cooperation. And this continues to be true despite the current pandemic.
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At the same time, one of the central pillars of the Administration’s policies towards Central Asia has been to sponsor increased U.S. trade and investment with those states. And when this crisis ends, their need for such trade and investment and our needs for markets will come together again. A second pillar is also security cooperation to meet the threats of terrorism and promote their defense capabilities and economies. Indeed, the U.S. has provided security assistance to states like Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. This aid not only enhances these states' capacity for self-defense, in some cases, it can also enhance their economic capabilities by creating jobs and training to local citizens and also helping to diffuse advanced technology throughout these countries. Their ties to the U.S. literally embody the principle governing all Central Asian states' foreign policies of not becoming overly dependent on any one provider of security, be it economic or military. This example of a multi-vector foreign policy is greatly facilitated by U.S. investment, both economic and security. Thus, Kazakhstan has successfully partnered with the South African based Paramount Group to build armored personnel vehicles and carriers to the point where it is on the verge of becoming an exporter of these vehicles to other countries.
Investment in and cooperation with entities like Kazakhstan Paramount Engineering (KPE) provides mutual benefits to the U.S. and Central Asian states, not only Kazakhstan. Such investments enhance local defense capabilities and create jobs and add to local industries in these countries. Ultimately, we could see cooperative projects, not unlike what is occurring in Europe, among these states that could add to the already growing trend towards regional cooperation among them. Such assistance simultaneously enhances American influence in these states while also imparting a greater sense of ownership of their self-defense to Central Asian governments. It would also allow at least a partial reduction of their dependency jupon Russian equipment and training, which are also conduits of Russian military-political influence.
Since the U.S. wants to return troops from Afghanistan to the U.S. or to other priority theaters in Europe or Asia, it is necessary that Washington help create among Central Asian states a stronger sense of confidence in our reliability and presence during peacetime to deter future crises. One way to do this would be to set up partnerships with local defense industries that would display U.S investment and presence while also helping reorient military thinking and production methods to non-Russian and non-Chinese models.
Adding to regional security in these ways is especially desirable at this time. Even as governments are stressed by the Coronavirus, investment projects in general, including in defense, sustain employment. Security cooperation allows them to build up their own capability for self-defense as in Kazakhstan’s case because we cannot rely upon the Taliban to uphold the new agreement. Neither can we rely upon the “tender mercies” of Russia and China. Moscow just launched a global oil war that severely constrains the economic opportunities and resources available to its alleged partners in the Eurasian Economic Union with scant regard for their interests. Meanwhile, China's solicitude for Central Asian interests is well known, and it is making more overt military as well as economic moves to shape regional trends there. Under the circumstance and even though Central Asia is not vital to the U.S. in the way that Europe or Northeast Asia are, its strategic importance has grown. The new U.S. strategy for Central Asia, the first of its kind, clearly envisions the region as being one of enhanced strategic importance. Therefore, programs that support this strategy and open the door to even wider fulfillment of its programmatic tendencies should be encouraged and welcomed. Whatever the impact of the Coronavirus is or will be, it will not negate geographic and fundamental strategic realities. Central Asia’s location between Russia and China is one of those realities, as is local states' search to diversify their foreign policy and achieve a balance among the great powers. Their quest fully meshes with our interests, so practical steps that support our and their goals make compelling strategic sense.
Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow at FPRI’s Eurasia Program. He has published over 900 articles and monographs on Soviet/Russian, U.S., Asian, and European military and foreign policies, testified frequently before Congress on Russia, China, and Central Asia, consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency, major think tanks and foundations, chaired major international conferences in the U.S. and in Florence; Prague; and London, and has been a commentator on foreign affairs in the media in the U.S. and abroad. He has also advised major corporations on investing in Russia and is a consultant for the Gerson Lehrmann Group. He has published or edited 15 books, most recently Russo-Chinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command (London: Global Markets Briefing, 2006). He has also published Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005). He is currently completing a book entitled Light From the East: Russia’s Quest for Great Power Status in Asia to be published in 2014 by Ashgate. Dr. Blank is also the author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Greenwood, 1994); and the co-editor of The Soviet Military and the Future (Greenwood, 1992).

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