War in Iran: Views in the Strategist

The war in Iran has just entered its second month. Supreme leader Ali Khamenei is dead, global fuel trade has stalled and the United States’ relationship with its allies is at a low. In this selection of Strategist articles, authors analyse the conflict so far and its effects on the global security landscape.

The threat posed by Tehran has increasingly captured Washington’s attention in recent years, culminating in the 28 February strikes, Parker writes. In doing so, it has drawn U.S. attention – and military support – away from the Indo-Pacific. We have already seen increased Chinese activity in the South China Sea during periods of U.S. distraction, the analyst notes.

If the U.S. achieves its aims in Iran, Washington may have renewed capacity to restore its focus on Indo-Pacific security and strengthen its regional deterrence against China.

If this succeeds, it could remove one persistent adversary from the U.S.’s strategic calculus and allow greater focus on the Indo-Pacific. For Australia, China’s military modernisation and coercive behaviour in our region represent the most consequential long-term security challenge. Sustained U.S. attention there matters to our strategic outlook.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has highlighted the dangers of relying on supplies passing through global chokepoints, and it isn’t only such chokepoint that Australia relies on, she says. ‘Roughly 83 percent of maritime imports and around 90 percent of exports’ to and from Australia move through Indonesian straits that are similarly vulnerable.

To deal with future shocks, Lockhorst says, Australia will need to determine how it can more quickly and easily move fuel internally when imports are disrupted. While previous efforts have focused on offshore reserves and stockpiling, focusing instead on distributed fuel resilience will leave Australia better prepared to respond when supply-chain links break.

[Distributed fuel resilience] includes larger northern storage facilities, greater redundancy in import terminals and expanded capacity to move fuel across the continent during disruption. It also means accelerating diversification through alternative fuels, synthetic fuels and defence-grade energy systems that reduce reliance on imported petroleum over time. Such investments would strengthen both economic resilience and military readiness.

Philip Radford writes that the U.S. is unlikely to gain control of the Strait of Hormuz. Radford compares the situation to 1915 operations in the Dardanelles, in which Britain and France failed to sufficiently suppress defensive artillery from Ottoman forces on the shore, forcing offensive littoral manoeuvres.

The U.S. today faces a similar situation, only ‘times 10’. Iran’s strong defensive position and ability to retreat to interior lines means that ‘it is inconceivable that the U.S. would try’ to conduct littoral operations.

The problem is this: the U.S. Navy can deny the Iranians the ability to operate on the waters of the strait—or anywhere for that matter—but the U.S. Navy cannot control the strait itself. Iran can deploy cheap anti-ship weaponry along the littoral of the strait with far greater ease and assurance than modern naval forces can reliably counter them. Dumb mass will defeat cutting-edge quality.

Planning is crucial for military operations, particularly at this level of conflict. The U.S.’s failure to consult allies prior to initiating attacks and its apparent lack of consideration of predictable outcomes have led Lieutenant General John Frewen to question the level of planning that went into Operation Epic Fury.

Frewen outlines elements that effective use of force requires: ‘clear, limited objectives; legality; prior planning; committed partners; and, even then, a measure of good luck.’ He suggests that the U.S. is relying heavily on the last element, as it’s light on the rest.

In the current case, it is hard to imagine any responsible planning process that did not identify the closure – or effective closure through threat – of the Strait of Hormuz as both likely and dangerous. That, in turn, raises hard questions about the extent and quality of the contingency planning undertaken and about why close allies were not brought into that planning well before the first strikes were ordered.

Win or lose, the result of this conflict could have significant implications for U.S. domestic politics, writes Lester Munson.

While a ‘muddled defeat for the U.S. and Israel’ alone might not shift the political scales, the resulting economic fallout could severely damage the Republican Party’s midterm election results, potentially leading to a Democratic win in the both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

A ‘limited U.S. victory’, on the other hand, could ‘transform the Middle east, leading to a real chance at stability and long-term economic growth across all sectarian divides in the world’s most volatile region.’ It could also neutralise a major ally of China and Russia.

Trump will be 80 this spring and has survived a nearly successful assassination attempt. His focus today is likely more on his legacy than the results of the next two U.S. elections. The bet here is that he would happily trade some domestic political turmoil for a win in Iran and a vastly more positive position for himself in U.S. and world history.

Tina Hosseini reflects on how some members of Australia’s Iranian diaspora have responded to the conflict. For Hosseini, feelings are mixed: while she vehemently opposes the regime, she also opposes the war, saying that ‘innocent people always lose’.

There is hope that this is the beginning of the end of the regime. For many Iranians, she says, Khamenei’s death was symbolic, as he represented 47 years of oppression and brutality. However, she also feels that it is ‘bittersweet’, as it has ‘denied justice to the hundreds of thousands of Iranians who were killed, and to the parents and families who have spent decades waiting for justice and accountability.’

Hosseini worries about the fact that this has come through force imposed by a foreign power. At the same time, she recognises that many Iranians believe that ‘the regime will never collapse on its own.’ She says that change should be ‘a transfer of space and power back to the Iranian people’, rather than ‘prolonged occupation.’

No one chooses foreign interference, but now that we have been brought to this point, the plea from many Iranians is simple: allow autonomy and self-determination. Let Iranians determine their own future. The Iranian people must be able to dismantle the system and choose their leaders through free and democratic elections, not leaders connected to the current regime or imposed from abroad.

This article appeared originally at The Strategist (ASPI).