Rethinking the National Defense Strategy

Crafting and articulating national security and defense strategies are hard, more so during a time of unusual economic, geopolitical, and technical change.  They must be ambitious yet credible, but, ultimately, our national defense will hinge largely on what we buy in things, people, and readiness.

Time horizons for strategies are important, and while ‘decisive decade’ is attractive alliteration, the war in Ukraine, Xi Jinping’s new five-year term, the rate of technological change, and our political turbulence argue for a shorter view of five years.  Many will say that is not strategic, but it might add the needed sense of urgency for adopting new technology, mobilizing and expanding the industrial base, and changing policy to enhance cooperation with allies and partners and to shape the broader defense workforce for the future.  

More flesh needs to be put on the bones of ‘campaigning.’  The concept is global, but the pacing region, the Indo-Pacific, draws lesser ambition.  Campaigning in Europe focuses on command and control, fires, and key enablers to increase combat credibility. Indo-Pacific campaigning seeks to build security architectures, invest in infrastructure, and improve access.   Combat credibility in the Indo-Pacific must also be an imperative.

The NDS wisely avoids numbers when discussing force posture, i.e., numbers of ships, aircraft, etc. But statements on the priorities of the types of forces would fit nicely in the section on regional goals.  Using the ubiquitous ‘Joint Force’ to address all evils everywhere masks our very real force structure and related industrial base shortcomings.  The Joint Force is not fungible.  Specifically, the vast maritime expanse of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and China’s large and more active navy demand a larger, combat credible U.S. Navy.  The NDS should not sidestep our navy being too small for that growing demand. Similarly, rightsizing needs should be included for ground and air forces in regions where those forces will be on point for the joint force.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is very well done and strikes the right balance– not too specific, but a clear statement of what’s in and what’s out.  Importantly, the Triad is in, thus underpinning the crucial recapitalization of the three legs of our nuclear deterrent.  Our allies will welcome the many references to the importance of allies and partners, and particularly a clear commitment to ‘extended deterrence’ being a ‘pillar’ of our strategy. As the NPR points out, we are on new ground facing two significant nuclear powers at the same time.  This is a reality that must continue to be emphasized.

The Missile Defense Review (MDR) appropriately includes the rapidly advancing threats posed by small Uncrewed Air Systems(sUAS).  They are sure to proliferate, and the 2022 MDR would have been a good time to move from the missile defense moniker to a more encompassing Integrated Air and Missile Defense Review.  That broader scope will better address UAS technology advancements and spur the needed evolution of the industrial base, operational concepts, integrated battle management architectures and systems, and enhanced operational alignment, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East where UAS proliferation is certain along with ballistic and hypersonic capability.

The criticality of the national defense workforce; military, civilian, and industrial base comes through clearly in all three documents.  We are at an inflection point regarding the nature of work, demographics, and workforce expectation.  Previous assumptions, personnel models, and means of attracting and retaining future generations to assure our national defense requires bold decisions and bolder personnel initiatives and programs.  The NDS should have signaled that boldness more directly.

Finally, a clear, unequivocal statement of the consequences of not moving quickly in implementing the strategy is needed.  Simply put, we could lose.

Again, developing and articulating a national defense strategy is hard.  Thinking anew and working collaboratively in the coming years to implement the NDS is also hard.  But now, that is what really matters.

Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Navy (Retired), was the Chief of Naval Operations, commanded the Pacific and Atlantic fleets, and is a member of BGR Group's Board of Advisors.