Islamic State and al-Qaeda Battle for Preeminence
Published June 9, 2016 • Read time: 8m
ISIL and al Qaeda are in a deadly competition to be the preeminent jihadi organization in the world. Since the advent of the so-called Islamic State, or ISIL, as the Obama Administration refers to the group, the competition seemed to be a one-sided affair in the favor of ISIL. However, it has now entered a new phase wherein al Qaeda is poised to gain back ground. In response to international efforts to counter its rise, ISIL has dramatically escalated its scope of operations, and, defying reason, has increased its brutality. In doing so, ISIL is actually ceding to al Qaeda its advantages in recruitment and in their support among the broader Muslim world. Weariness among supporters of ISIL is beginning to set in with the so-called Caliphate’s over-the-top violent activities and hypocrisy, such as targeting non-combatants and driving sectarian conflict, resulting in many Muslim deaths. A shift in recruitment trends favoring al Qaeda, despite al Qaeda’s significant drop off in capabilities over the last decade, is now entirely plausible.
In order to evaluate a jihadi group’s strength and relevance, it is important to understand how such organizations gain followers and fighters, which are the lifeblood of their efforts. In general, such organizations gain followers and recruits by positioning themselves as the foremost entity capable of fighting the injustices afflicting potential recruits. While recruitment is certainly not the sole factor that determines a jihadi organization’s success, it is a bellwether for the viability of the group and its preeminence amongst its peers. And despite the differences in ideology and approach to waging their fights, both ISIL and al Qaeda are largely pulling from the same pool of potential recruits.
Over the last few years, ISIL has handily won the recruitment competition with at least 10,000 foreign fighters flocking to their black banners per year. ISIL was the most effective fighting force in the struggle against the divisive Shia regime in Baghdad, and displayed strength against the Assad regime and Syrian rebels. Through aggressive propaganda and early surprising battlefield victories, ISIL capitalized on festering resentment of Western powers, like the United States and NATO, who seemingly ignored the plight of oppressed Syrians and abandoned Iraqi Sunnis following the end of military operations in Iraq in 2011.
Moreover, ISIL jumped ahead in the al Qaeda game plan by declaring itself a Caliphate, effectively providing many ideologically-driven local combatants and global jihadi recruits a stronger banner to fight under immediately, and not in the indeterminate future. As a previous subsidiary of the al Qaeda franchise system under al-Zarqawi (the bloodthirsty estranged leader of al Qaeda in Iraq), ISIL’s current leadership core would have implicitly understood that abandoning the flagging al Qaeda core leadership and leap frogging the al Qaeda longterm game plan would capture the zeal of many impatient recruits wanting to commit to a larger ideology which hearkened back to distorted perceptions of divinely-ordained medieval Muslim empires. It worked and catapulted ISIL to the forefront of global attention in the span of just a few years.
Conversely, al Qaeda has sought to remove the Far Devil (the United States and other Western powers) from Muslim nations before attempting to establish a Caliphate. It has done so by targeting symbolic institutions like the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11. Its strategy was twofold: to show the inherent weakness of major powers to a dedicated group of so-called warriors of Islam; and it aimed to draw these powers into a protracted ground war on terrain more favorable to the mujahideen-style forces – such as those who fought the USSR during its 1980s war in Afghanistan. Yet like Icharus, al Qaeda overreached in its ambition.
Al Qaeda has only recently managed to recover from a decade of intense Western counter-terrorism policies that saw Osama bin Laden killed, its core leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands obliterated by a relentless drone strike campaign, and its global appeal diminished in favor of the upstart former al Qaeda franchise. And in the post-9/11 era, much of al Qaeda’s global recruitment efforts have been marginalized to its once hallmark spheres of expansion in Yemen and Africa. However, al Qaeda has been able to exploit the temporary reprieve from Western counter-terrorism efforts that various civil wars and failed states have gifted its franchises. This consolidation of gains will be essential for al Qaeda to be able to successfully recast itself as the best option to foreign fighters traveling from across the globe and not from within combat zones. But ISIL, through its excessively violent attacks on fellow Muslims, is doing just as much as these conflicts to provide al Qaeda an opening to leverage itself into the recruitment race lead once again.
In Yemen, a Catholic ministry home for the elderly founded by Mother Theresa was attacked by ISIL gunmen (18 elderly inhabitants and six nuns were tied up and executed). Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri quickly rebuked his ISIL counterpart, lecturing Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on how to conduct militant affairs. Yes, the terrorist entity that carried out the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001, killing 2,996 people and injuring nearly 6,000 more, chastised its rival on the brutality of ISIL’s attacks. Why in the world would this be happening? Because al Qaeda is looking to snatch up a market share that ISIL is steadily alienating with its antics, and in an already small market, every recruit counts. And in light of the figures emerging on the attrition rates of recruitment that ISIL is facing, prospects for al Qaeda are looking up.
Al Qaeda’s response to the recent attack on the Yemeni nursing home is an indicator that the group may seek a path of “moderation” to win more recruits that have become disillusioned with the shooting star of ISIL. If al Qaeda can successfully portray itself as a more inclusive jihadi organization to the opposition groups and fighters within the various regional recruitment hotspots, they stand to benefit greatly from a perceived moderation. To less extreme and wavering sympathizers of ISIL, the more “traditional” attacks in Brussels and Istanbul will erase the extent of unjustified extremity to which it went in Yemen, but the attacks won’t fully absolve ISIL of its barbarous targeting of Muslims and people universally viewed as non-combatants. Al Qaeda will look to portray ISIL’s barbarous attacks as aimed at killing other Muslims, and position itself as the entity most aligned with defending the common Muslim’s way of life.
Lastly, as Western-led military campaigns on Mosul and Raqqa begin to take their toll on ISIL, the so-called Caliphate will likely see a further drop off in recruitment. To combat that, it will seek to broaden its terrorist operations beyond the territorial restraints of Iraq and Syria to preserve relevance, push al Qaeda further aside, and exact revenge on the Western powers that were involved in the military campaigns on Mosul and Raqqa. Given that this strategic adaptation will overlap with al Qaeda’s approach of targeting Western symbols and cities to attract recruits, it is unlikely al Qaeda will sit on the sidelines; an uptick in comparable attacks would be a logical outcome of the two entities’ competition. Zawahiri’s Al Qaeda will attempt to undermine ISIL philosophically and theologically by demeaning its brutal attacks as un-Islamic and their more-restrained attacks as the true way to conduct ‘jihad’.
ISIL undeniably found an early clarity and tapped into resentment simmering across the Middle East and in radicalized young people around the world. But it is unlikely that the brutal proto-state can sustain its appeal at levels like those of the past few years. With recruits already becoming disillusioned with the offerings of life in the so-called Caliphate and the diminishing appeal to potential recruits due to ISIL’s excessive targeting of Muslims, its tactical and strategic overreach will likely spur irreversible trends in recruitment towards al Qaeda, such as al Qaeda’s al Nusra Front affiliate in Syria. Many of these recruits cite ISIL’s targeting of other Muslims - as opposed to tyrannical rulers like Syria’s Bashar al-Assad - as their rationale for leaving ISIL. Considering the long-term resilience of al Qaeda in the global jihadi movement due to its discerning targeting (by jihadi standards), it would only be natural for the pendulum to swing back towards al Qaeda.
There is little doubt that the war of propaganda and competition for recruits will take on a new tempo in the coming years, characterized by more attacks on symbolic and vulnerable Western targets. What remains to be seen is whether al Qaeda will succumb to the pressures applied to it by ISIL’s move to an extremity of questionable proportions even within terrorist strategic reasoning, or if it will employ a path to “moderation” to capture the middle ground for jihadist recruitment. In either case, ISIL’s savage tactics have dictated a bloody new paradigm in modern terrorism, one that could take generations to recover from.
Matthew Kriner is the Associate Director for Subject Matter Fellows at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. He formerly served as the Director of Political Affairs at the Israeli Consulate to the Southeast United States. Matthew will be studying at IDC Herzilya for a MA in Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security this Fall.

South Korea’s Nuclear-Powered Submarines After the Midterms
By Jihoon Yu • RealClearDefense
Why Build a Billion-Dollar Warship if a Cheap Drone Can Sink It?
By Ege Can Gün • RealClearDefense
Megaspeed Proves: Congress Must Act on Chip Security
By Michael Groen • RealClearDefense
Creating a MEF Insurance Policy
By Steven Bancroft • RealClearDefense
Operation Epic Fury and the Illusion of Victory
By Stephen D. Cook • RealClearDefense

South Korea’s Nuclear-Powered Submarines After the Midterms
By Jihoon Yu • RealClearDefense
Why Build a Billion-Dollar Warship if a Cheap Drone Can Sink It?
By Ege Can Gün • RealClearDefense
Creating a MEF Insurance Policy
By Steven Bancroft • RealClearDefense
U.S. Navy Used Expired Munitions During Iran War
By Riley Ceder, Navy Times
The Coast Guard Icebreaker Nobody Wanted
By David Roza, Task & Purpose
