Rearmament and the Italian Dilemma

Abstract: Within European rearmament, it is necessary to rediscover the Italian national interest, evaluating with clarity who our enemies are, where we must focus. The real threat is in the Mediterranean. Without a clear naval focus, Italy risks strategic irrelevance.

From the Italian perspective, Moscow is not a direct enemy. Both geography and Russia’s current military weakness make an invasion of Italy highly unrealistic. After more than three years of attrition in Ukraine, Russia lacks the strength to project power toward the Peninsula.

The real threat for Rome lies to the south. Containing Russia on the northern front will fall primarily to countries that are geographically more exposed. Italy’s strategic focus must instead be on its vulnerabilities in the Mediterranean and North Africa. If rearmament is to make sense, it should not prepare for a land invasion that is unlikely to come, but for strategic control of the southern flank – where Russia and Turkey are actively competing for influence, and where Italy’s national interests are most directly at stake.

Turkey is even more active. Although formally a NATO member, Ankara uses its position to expand power with a clear neo-Ottoman vision. The 2019 maritime deal with Tripoli redrew energy boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, binding western Libya to Turkey and creating a direct Misurata–Ankara axis. On the ground, Ankara has supplied drones, weapons, and Syrian fighters in violation of the UN arms embargo, as confirmed by Security Council reports and EU Operation IRINI (Irini is the Greek word for “peace”). At the same time, Turkey has secured energy and infrastructure deals with Tripoli, turning Libya into a bridgehead for its Mavi Vatan – the “Blue Homeland” doctrine – projecting influence across the Mediterranean and into North Africa.

Turkey is pushing Libya into an orbit increasingly dependent on Ankara, narrowing Europe’s room for maneuver and sidelining Italy in what was once its strategic backyard. Combined with Russia’s growing presence to the east and south, the result is even more critical: two powers consolidating their positions in the wider Mediterranean, transforming the area into an unstable and contested front.

For Rome, this means only one thing: if rearmament is to make sense, it must be calibrated toward the Mediterranean. Italy must strengthen maritime control, the defense of critical infrastructure, rapid power-projection capabilities toward North Africa and the Sahel, and naval intelligence. Only in this way can it defend its vital interests and avoid being crushed between Turkish expansionism and Russian penetration.

The Mattei Plan (PM Giorgia Meloni’s effort to increase Italy’s influence in Africa) moves precisely in this direction, but its implementation today remains fragile, especially in Libya. With its focus on energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and security, the plan could address these challenges. Yet it currently suffers from a clear limitation: Libya is not at the center of Italy’s strategy. Agreements with Algeria, Congo, and Senegal are useful, but without Tripoli the overall design remains incomplete.

The evidence continues to emerge: Italian Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi was declared persona non grata and expelled by the eastern Libyan authorities for having violated local protocols during a visit as part of a European delegation. This is not the behavior of an “adult in the room”: it demonstrates that, on the ground, Libya remains an uncertain theater in which  Italian policy lacks clear direction.   

As a result, Rome has been paying a heavy price. From an energy perspective, Eni (Italy’s largest petroleum company) managed to maintain its presence but without the same strategic exclusivity. On the migratory front, the Libyan route turned into an uncontrollable springboard into Italy. And geopolitically, Russia and Turkey have gained significant ground, while we – despite being the most exposed country – have been marginalized.

A reassertion of Italian – and NATO – self-interest on the alliance’s southern flank must begin with the integration of rearmament and the Mattei Plan.  The Mattei Plan must become the economic and political tool to stabilize our closest neighbor, starting with Libya. Rearmament should serve to protect our interests in the Mediterranean and to guarantee Italy’s international credibility, while also pushing back – if necessary with force – against Russian and Turkish influence.

Yet the grand strategy requires something else. It is on the seas that the fate of the peninsula is – and always has been – decided. The Italian Navy remains the only instrument capable of ensuring freedom of navigation, safeguarding energy flows, and projecting influence across the Mediterranean – our natural geopolitical theater. Recent modernization programs – from the FREMM EVO frigates to the PPA patrol vessels and the U212 NFS submarines – suggest a growing awareness, albeit limited to defense insiders. But Italians as a whole still lack a collective consciousness: we are a maritime nation, not a continental one.

Italy, like much of Europe, is unprepared for rearmament – and risks doing it the wrong way. Structural weaknesses make the effort fragile: defense spending is skewed toward salaries and pensions, leaving little for training or modern equipment; Rome has long relied on NATO and the EU for its security, eroding its ability to act autonomously; and unlike Poland or the Baltic states, Italy faces no immediate threat at its land borders, which dampens public and political urgency. There is also the temptation to label civilian infrastructure projects as “defense spending,” diverting resources away from building a credible deterrent.

Italy’s mindset presents a more formidable obstacle. It is a “post-historical” society: decades of peace have fostered the illusion that war is impossible, eroding the willingness to sacrifice prosperity for defense. Demographics compound the problem: with one of the lowest birth rates in the world and a median age of 48, Italy lacks the young manpower needed for a motivated force. Society prioritizes consumption and leisure, while the idea of national defense as a common good has faded. Unlike Poland or Israel – where external threats shape national identity – Italy has lost the ethos of defending the homeland. Surveys show that only a minority of Italians, Germans, and French would fight if war broke out, creating armies with advanced weapons but too few prepared to use them. For Washington, this translates into three risks: that Europeans rearm too little, only on paper, or, in the most remote possibility, too much – raising the prospect of an unbalanced European giant like Germany.

Each course would be dangerous for the United States. A strategic burden-sharing arrangement, in which NATO’s European maritime capabilities lighten U.S. commitments, would be a good start. Without it, Russia, China, and Iran will exploit every Western division. NATO already coordinates on paper, but the real challenge is building capacity and using it strategically.  That requires reinforcing the southern flank. By history and geography, that responsibility falls above all to Italy. Rome must secure the Mediterranean, contain Russian and Turkish influence, and provide stability for the Alliance. Italy’s future will be decided at sea. Only a navy strong enough to dominate the Mediterranean can defend national interests and preserve credibility.

Riccardo Ficicchia is a geopolitical analyst with the Istituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali (IARI)