Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security

Since the birth of our Nation, Americans have relied on the Navy and Marine Corps to safeguard their safety and security by responding quickly and effectively to global crises and contingencies. For over sixty years, Carrier Strke Groups (CSGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with embarked Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs or commonly Marine Expeditionary Units or MEUs) have done the heavy lifting to ensure U.S. national security interests and the lives of American citizens were safeguarded throughout the world.  

The idea of putting a Marine capability on Navy capital ships other than amphibious is not novel. Nor should it be arbitrarily dismissed as passe or obsolete. Rather, it deserves careful consideration when options for mitigating the adverse national security impacts of insufficient amphibious ships are too often tossed into the “too hard bucket.”

This concept is different than simply putting Marines back aboard Navy ships as part of the crew, as was the case with the traditional Marine Detachments aboard carriers, cruisers, and some tenders. Those detachments were assigned shipboard duties such as protecting special weapons and running the ship’s brig. The concept we are proposing would instead task-organize Marines for a capability set, train them to a standard prior to deployment, and focus them on the mission throughout the deployment. While not nearly as large as a 2,000-man MEU, nor with all the capabilities of a MEU, our force would be a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) with capabilities tailored to the mission.

Real world examples of operational deficiencies created by gaps in forward deployed ARGs/MEUs are not hard to spot. One of the best and most recent examples was the hostilities in the Middle East. For most of the time, there was no ARG/MEU in the Eastern Mediterranean, North Arabian Sea, or the Persian Gulf. But there were carriers and other Navy ships in the area. Would it not have been prudent to have a Marine capability deployed on these ships to respond to contingencies such as a limited NEO, rapid reinforcement of an embassy or consulate, rescue of a downed pilot, limited raid against a high value target, or other mission? Let’s consider two real-world examples, one illustrative of the art of the possible and the other emblematic of how a small force can have a strategic impact.

In 2023, the United States urgently needed to evacuate the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan amid deteriorating security conditions. At the time, there was no ARG/MEU or even a CVBG in the Mediterranean or Red Sea areas. The best the Navy could do was dispatch the Expeditionary Fast Transport USNS Brunswick (T-EPF-6) and the Expeditionary Sea Base USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-3) to assist in the evacuation of American citizens. Imagine the possibilities if a specially tailored Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) had been rapidly deployed to operate from these non-traditional ships.

In 1995, U.S. Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady was shot down over Bosnia. He spent six days evading enemy soldiers before being rescued by a small security team of two dozen U.S. Marines, two CH-53E heavy lift helicopters, and two AH-1W attack helicopters from the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3). The rescue was hailed throughout the world as an example of U.S. military professionalism and prowess. Had an ARG/MEU not been in the Mediterranean, O’Grady might have been captured with the concomitant loss of U.S. prestige and clout in the region. But fast forward to today and consider a similar scenario where a traditional MEU is missing but a CVBG is on scene with an embarked SPMAGTF. The mission could still be conducted.

The O’Grady rescue is but one of many examples where a small force can have a major impact on world events. The Navy and Marines need a capability to respond quickly and effectively in the absence of an ARG/MEU. Some emergencies could be resolved immediately; some might have to be stabilized until a larger force arrives.

Assuming the Commandant agrees that the absence of forward deployed Marines is a problem worth addressing, we recommend he work with the Navy and within the Marine Corps Combat Development Command to develop a concept and the requirements needed to restore a time-sensitive crisis response capability on carriers and other ships when the ARG/MEU is not available.  

General Charles (Chuck) Krulak (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a career infantry officer. He served as the 31^st Commandant of the Marine Corps.

General James (Jim) Conway (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a career infantry officer. He served as the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps.