Maladies, Remedies and Optimizing Security

Last week, Peter Dutton gave his first speech as Minister for Defence.

On the face of it, these points are sensible enough. An increased U.S. presence would practically improve Australia’s defence potential by enhancing training with the world’s preeminent military power as well as swelling the quantity of armed forces that any adversary would face if directly attacking the continent.

Despite this, Dutton’s proposals should be matched with more cautious language to signal that where the U.S. goes, Australia does not necessarily follow. Otherwise, the government’s American remedy risks exacerbating Australia’s security malady.

Defence Minister Peter Dutton (left) during a visit to Gallipoli Barracks, Brisbane in April (Department of Defence)

This is because the most grievous defence risk facing Australia, involvement in a shooting war with China, is most likely to occur as a consequence of U.S. engagement rather than any separate issue between Canberra and Beijing. This reflects a lack of issues between Australia and China that might cause a “miscalculation or misunderstanding” leading to war: there is neither an over-arching militarised competition, or any specific hot-button matters that may serve as immediate and direct tripwires.

Do Australians really want to send warships to fight over contested atolls in the South China Sea? Or troops to fend off an attack on Taiwan? Would Australia make much difference if it did?

As I’ve written before, in these scenarios Canberra might want to take the sensible approach Washington did with London before Pearl Harbour: provide diplomatic, logistic and intelligence support, but keep away from the shooting until shot-at first.

But this will be much harder to achieve if the strategic mindset in Australia and America is “one-in, all-in”. And Beijing will have more incentive to attack if it believes Australia’s front-line involvement is inevitable. Better to send submarines and sink ships at dock, for instance, rather than waiting for them turning up in battle supporting the U.S..

So, how can Australia have its cake (the practical security benefits of more U.S. engagement) and eat it too (not being dragged into a war it is trying to avoid)?

A key answer is keeping the defence cooperation but with better signalling – to both Washington and Beijing. Neither China nor the U.S. should assume Australia will be in the thick of any fighting just because of its American relationship (noting in any case that the ANZUS Treaty only requires the parties to “consult” in the event of a conflict).

As part of this, Dutton’s future speeches might better note that the only thing “core” to deterring attacks on Australia is the Australian Defence Force, not the U.S. alliance.

And more is needed to elevate, in parallel to expanded engagement, a message that Australia is a peaceful nation that will only engage in military actions as and where it sees fit, unless its hand is forced by an attack. A conscious policy of strategic ambiguity might serve this role well – and also cool tempers in both Beijing and Washington.

Such a balanced approach provides a good option to pursue what should be the objective of any government policy (security or otherwise): maximising the benefits for Australia (and Australians) while minimising costs.

On this note, Dutton also remarked that “we cannot simply seek to ring-fence Australians from complex and difficult issues.” Yet this is precisely what Canberra (or any other capital) should be aiming to achieve for its polity. In his upcoming speeches (and policies) this objective should be better recognised and pursued.

Victor Abramowicz is PhD candidate and sessional academic at Curtin University, specialising in defence policy and strategy, military technology, security relations in East Asia and Eastern Europe, and military history. He is also the Principal of Ostoya Consulting, which provides advisory and business development services to a range of companies in the defence sector.

Victor has published opinion pieces in The Interpreter which have been noted internationally, and provided commentary on security issues in publications including Bloomberg Businessweek.

This article appeared originally at Lowy Institute's the interpreter.