Is Upgrading the Canadian Army a Mission Impossible?

"I can't think of any circumstances where it should take years to go out and buy a commercial truck.”

The U.S. president-elect’s first-term refrain about ally defence spending is still ringing in our ears, as Russian forces grind through the Donbass. Wisely, nations are upping their defence budgets in a bid to appease him and bring themselves up to standard.

Belligerently, Canada waddles on.

In case readers are unaware, military procurement in Canada has all the alacrity of an upturned goldfish. The replacement of G-Wagon light utility vehicles paints a representative picture. Despite launching in 2017, after postponement of the lion’s share of the procurement, according to Radio-Canada’s Murray Brewster, it will not be complete until 2030.

“Moreover, the estimated cost of the program has increased to between $750 million and $1 billion, compared to an initial projection of $499 million,” Brewster writes, adding that if the schedule is met, a relatively simple procurement program will have taken 13 years to complete.

Even Defence Minister Blair has called into question the extremes of due diligence that restrict and slow simple purchases. Well aware of the wider issues at play, Blair continues to sound the drum for procurement reform: 

One of the things that is a source of frustration for the [Canadian Armed Forces], for DND, for the Government of Canada and certainly for the minister of defence, is that our procurement processes have many, many layers, which does not always enable us to achieve the result as rapidly as we need to achieve the result.

His sentiments are echoed elsewhere in the government. Jean-Yves Duclos, Canada’s Minister of Public Services and Procurement, speaking at CANSEC 2024 in May, acknowledged that the process needed to be streamlined:

Canada needs a procurement system that functions effectively and efficiently so it can better respond to evolving security threats and emerging capability requirements. As it stands, however, defence procurement can be a long and arduous process.

Unfortunately, utility vehicles are of minor concern when compared to the mountain of challenges facing the procurement and modernization agenda of the Canadian Armed Forces. Canada is Framework Nation for NATO’s Multinational Battalion Latvia battle group, soon to be Brigade Latvia — a responsibility heaped on top of defense obligations to North America and the Arctic zone.

The Light Utility Vehicle purchase is one example. Then there is the well-publicised, decade-long process to replace Canada’s aging fleet of CF-18 Hornet jet fighters. And the multi-decade effort to replace the Royal Canadian Navy’s 12 Halifax-class frigates and three destroyers.

Despite being of considerable importance, considering NATO commitments in Latvia, Canadian Army parallels are less well known. Their procurement blunders are covered less by the media and tend to feature only in specialized news sources, attracting less attention and having a smaller impact on Canadian public opinion. This, in turn, means that politicians are less incentivised to notice. A troubling dynamic when one learns about episodes like the failure to budget for essential artillery projects like the Indirect Fires Modernization (IFM) program.

While there are many procurement programs required to bring the Canadian Armed Forces up to speed, a strong argument can be made for artillery being priority one.

Canada’s IFM program, which aims to bring Canadian artillery into the current century, suffers from a lack of clarity around financing — inviting some commentators to liken it to a fairytale. Canadian Army Today’s Ian Coutts wrote the following back in 2020:

In funding terms, IFM seems a bit of a Cinderella. Ground-Base Air Defence (GBAD), Joint Fires Modernization (JFM) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Modernization (ISR Mod) were all singled out in Strong, Secure, Engaged, the government’s 2017 blueprint for future needs and strategy, and with it, funding for procurement. IFM was not included. Although only a small amount of funding has been earmarked for the initial stages of the procurement process, the Army is nonetheless treating it as a key capability.

Fast-forward a few years, to the end of 2023, and the situation had hardly changed, according to a report by Colonel Bouckaert, Director of Artillery:

While IFM is still not yet funded, the identified indirect fires gap was highlighted by CCA as his number one priority. DLR 2 is developing a recommended option for CAF to implement once funding is provided by new government policy.

The situation is concerning when one considers the vital role of artillery and the fact that, in Canada, procurement delays and cost overruns for existing programs can so often be staggering.

Underscoring the disarray, Indirect Fires is not even included in recent announcements about the Latvia task force accelerated purchases:

Following Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, an analysis of the Canadian Armed Forces' capability requirements led to the designation of air defence, counter-uncrewed aircraft system, and anti-tank weapon system capabilities as Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR).

The fact that this is an unfunded priority would be a major handicap for any army in the world — but this is a Canadian army already in a state near paralysis. Any further delay in initiating the project will only be compounded by defective Canadian procurement procedures, making a realistic timeline for artillery replacements vanishingly unclear — especially as there is no indication that a clear choice is on the cards in terms of the equipment.

Canada's choice of artillery could be dictated by circumstances: while the war in Ukraine has made towed artillery, and therefore the M777, virtually obsolete, the administration's deficiencies could deprive them of the choice of tracked howitzers, too. These models are typically more expensive, particularly in strategic deployment at distance, which remains the most likely option for the Canadian army. Avoiding that price tag leaves truck-mounted artillery, a choice that is not necessarily a problem. Many allies have made the same compromise and feedback from Ukraine has been favorable. Options include the Boxer RCH and the Caesar, to mention just a few. Either way, this kind of acquisition needs to be thought through thoroughly in terms of ‘best value for money.’

Yet, given that Canada’s extensively cautious attempts at procurement often delay decisions to the point of absurdity, there is a real risk that the process drags on. Even after a purchase, the resulting response might still be poorly adapted to purpose: Canada bought Arctic sleeping bags recently that were, comically, not warm enough to be used in Arctic conditions.

The Canadian Armed Forces need to overcome these kinds of shortcomings, and this requires military and political decision-makers to understand that times have changed: as other NATO members have begun to do, Canada must transform its military from an international policing expeditionary force – one experiencing almost no losses – into a high-intensity army that can handle the necessary attrition of modern conflict.

Ukraine has demonstrated that casualties numbers can be significant. Absorbing this damage requires a mass of forces, made feasible through the right balance in the sophistication and quantity of equipment. To do this, Canada must recover from decades-long deficits in military spending and procurement.

Andrew Latham, Ph.D., a tenured professor at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He is also a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Ottawa and a non-resident fellow with DefensePriorities, a think tank in Washington, DC.