Securing the Connective Tissue of the Global Commons: The Indian Ocean Gap

As the Pentagon approaches its September 18 force-posture review, the strategic logic underlying American military deployments demands rigorous re-examination. The measure of a global force posture is not simply how many forces the United States stations in its principal theaters, but whether it can see, move, communicate, sustain, and act across the global commons that connect them—the sea lines of communication, maritime chokepoints, undersea infrastructure, and logistical networks upon which both military mobility and global commerce depend.

This increased Pacific focus coincides with two concurrent posture adjustments that could magnify the problem. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is examining how to reduce its reliance on large, static installations in the Persian Gulf because of missile and drone threats, potentially dispersing its weight eastward toward the Arabian Sea. At the same time, Pacific planning is concentrating increasing attention on the First Island Chain and the Western Pacific.

The result is a potential gap between theaters: the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean itself. Strengthening the Pacific while dispersing the Gulf posture does not eliminate the strategic requirement to secure the maritime system connecting them. Energy flows, commercial shipping, military mobility, undersea infrastructure, and communications all pass through this space. A posture that secures the endpoints while neglecting the connections creates vulnerabilities that adversaries, criminal networks, and other hostile actors are positioned to exploit.

That vulnerability is both operational and physical. Operational contingencies do not respect geographic boundaries drawn for administrative convenience. A crisis near the Strait of Hormuz could affect shipping and military mobility across the Arabian Sea, while disruption near the Malacca Strait could reverberate into the Bay of Bengal and beyond. Maritime-domain awareness, intelligence integration, and operational coordination, therefore, become increasingly important wherever command responsibilities and strategic interests intersect.

The physical infrastructure must support that continuity. A more distributed force posture cannot depend solely on a handful of concentrated installations. It requires resilient networks of access, sustainment, communications, maintenance, fuel, and prepositioned capabilities capable of supporting forces across distance. Facilities such as Duqm in Oman illustrate the importance of access beyond the Persian Gulf itself. But individual locations are only useful to the extent that they form part of a larger system capable of supporting mobility and reinforcing forces when and where required.

This is where India becomes strategically difficult to ignore.

India occupies a uniquely consequential position in the northern Indian Ocean, linking the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal while sitting astride maritime routes connecting the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the broader Indo-Pacific. Its geography gives it significance that extends well beyond bilateral defense cooperation. If the Indian Ocean is understood as the maritime hinge connecting major U.S. theaters, India’s position becomes central to the continuity of the wider system.

The U.S.–India defense relationship has developed substantial foundations, but it remains neither settled nor fully operational. Washington and New Delhi have established mechanisms for deeper cooperation, while important questions concerning access, interoperability, logistics, technology transfer, information sharing, and operational coordination remain subject to negotiation. India also continues to balance deeper defense cooperation with its longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy.

What has received insufficient strategic attention is the Indian Ocean itself. The maritime-domain awareness, integrated logistics and intelligence, and pre-coordinated mechanisms needed to secure open sea lanes have not been adequately incorporated into the strategic framework of the relationship. This is a consequential oversight, particularly for Washington, given the Indian Ocean’s importance to U.S. global force posture.

The core objective should be a shared Indian Ocean maritime architecture—one capable of maintaining awareness, sustaining forces, protecting commerce, and preserving access across the maritime space connecting the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. These are not simply secondary benefits of closer bilateral defense cooperation; they are fundamental requirements if the United States and India are to address the strategic realities of the region together.

Addressing this gap requires neither a new combatant command nor a fixed basing arrangement, but a clear-eyed assessment of whether existing structures fit today’s strategic geography. The issue is not who holds administrative responsibility for a particular area of ocean, but whether the United States can maintain continuity of awareness, access, sustainment, and decision-making across the maritime space connecting its principal theaters.

This distinction—between administrative responsibility and functional continuity—is critical as Washington reassesses its global force posture. Evaluating East Asia and the Middle East as isolated strategic problems obscures the maritime system that binds them together. Fortifying the Western Pacific and dispersing the Gulf footprint while treating the vast ocean between them as mere transit territory risks building a posture with strong flanks and an exposed center.

The September 18 review, therefore, presents an opportunity to ask a question larger than where American forces will be stationed: Has the United States accounted for the maritime infrastructure and strategic relationships required to make its regional forces function as a unified global force?

The answer should be measured in functional terms: whether American forces can see, move, communicate, sustain, and act across the spaces that connect those theaters. The Indian Ocean is neither an empty corridor nor merely a seam between commands. It is a critical operating environment in its own right—and an increasingly consequential hinge upon which the future architecture of American sea power and global force posture may depend.

Sue Ghosh Stricklett is an attorney, a widely published author, and national security law expert specializing in export controls, emerging technologies, and strategic competition. She is the founder of Digital Archives Pro™, an AI data provenance platform building strategic knowledge infrastructure.