Escalation Without Detonation: Russia's Nuclear Threats

Fears of a renewed arms race are echoing around the world once again, ignited by last month’s expiration of New Start, the last treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenal deployment. This week, former Russian President and current chairman of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, accused the U.K. and France of planning a “direct transfer of nuclear weapons” and threatened a “symmetrical response” from Russia.  Putin recognizes the threat of nuclear escalation is almost more powerful in influencing policy decisions than an actual attack and has used this fear to attempt to shape the West’s decision-making throughout the war in Ukraine. The West must recognize Putin’s cognitive manipulation for what it is and call him out on his bluff.

When rhetoric alone is insufficient, Putin turns to fake escalatory advances. In November 2024, following the U.S.’s decision to finally provide long-range missiles to Ukraine, Russia used its nuclear-capable Oreshnik missile against Dnipro, Ukraine, and launched a parallel-running information campaign emphasizing the missile’s destructive capability. Despite Russia’s fearmongering, U.S. officials noted the missile was “not a gamechanger on the battlefield, but rather just another attempt by Russia to terrorize Ukraine.” Similarly, in October 2025 after Trump sanctioned Russia’s two largest oil producers, Putin launched a test of the nuclear-capable underwater weapon, Poseidon, with media projecting his comments about there being “no way to intercept it.” As Poseidon has been in testing since at least 2018, this is no novel threat; it was yet another instance of Putin’s use of nuclear weapons for psychological effect.

Now, Putin is applying the tactic again, using nuclear threats to attempt to coerce the U.S. into responding to New START’s expiration. Russia’s foreign ministry has claimed that, amidst the uncertain revival of New START, Russia is “developing its policy in the field of strategic offensive arms” and “remains prepared to take decisive military-technical countermeasures to mitigate additional threats to national security.”  While these statements insinuate Russia might increase its number of deployed nukes or even expand its nuclear arsenal in lieu of an arms control agreement, it is most likely another of Putin’s psychological games.

Indeed, the regime has upped this rhetoric in the last several days in response to France and the U.K.’s alleged “plans” to provide Ukraine with nuclear capabilities. Both former president Dmitry Medvedev and current Ministry of Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova have threatened direct nuclear retaliation, warning that supplying Ukraine with nuclear power risks “direct military conflict between nuclear powers.” The claims, originally made by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), point to yet another Kremlin-fabricated narrative used to justify aggression and nuclear posturing.

Putin has no rational incentive to use nukes. But this isn’t about strategic reality; it’s about deceiving Washington. Putin’s goal is a protracted war where he exhausts Washington to the point where the Trump administration eventually stops supporting Ukraine and backs down in negotiations. These manipulations mirror the Soviet technique of reflexive control, a strategy that uses information operations to influence the target's decision-making. The strategy was used during the Cold War to foster paranoia and uncertainty amongst American leaders regarding the Soviet Union’s actual nuclear capacity. Putin, who comes from a KGB background, certainly knows the power of such operations and has become adept at employing them.

It is time for Washington to put an end to Moscow’s nuclear bluff. In 2022, Trump stated that if he were president, he would threaten Putin with American submarine-launched nuclear threats should Putin continue alluding to potential Russian nuclear attacks. And he did. In July 2025, after Russia’s former President Dmitry Medvedev threatened nuclear war, Trump responded that he would station two nuclear submarines in “appropriate regions” to counter Moscow’s threat. Actions like this call out the hollowness of Putin’s claims and cast a shadow of doubt on Putin’s infallibility. However, truly stopping the Kremlin’s games requires putting them on the defensive. To this end, Washington should also develop its own game. Washington could remind Moscow of the myriad negative consequences of Putin’s use of nuclear weapons and saturate Russian media with the capabilities of America’s own nuclear arsenal. Further, Washington could plant the seeds of doubt amongst Russians, exposing the vast failures Putin has made on the battlefield in Ukraine and showing how Putin relies on empty threats because he is playing a losing game.

 For years, Moscow has rattled the nuclear saber; Washington should stop pretending these threats are credible. To the Kremlin, resuscitating the New START treaty is little more than a scrap of paper in the face of winning the war in Ukraine, and Putin responds to power, not promises. Nuclear weapons are Russia’s psychological leverage, and Washington should not let this treaty dictate its strategy.

Ivana Stradner is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where RADM Mark Montgomery (U.S. Navy, ret.) is a senior director at its Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation.