Failures Lead to Success
Last updated 05:49 PM EDT • Read time: 5m
Summary – Recently, the Missile Defense Agency conducted a live-fire test of the SM-3 IIA missile. The test was not successful intercepting a ballistic missile target and was deemed a failure. On the path to success, failure is a price that is often paid to develop combat capable weapons systems. As the commissioning Operations Officer of USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), I experienced a “failure” during the testing of the ship’s weapons systems. That failure ultimately resulted in better software for the Aegis Weapon System; and consequently, a more capable combat system was fielded to defend our nation.
Failures Lead to Success
Failure doesn’t always mean failure. In the testing of complex weapons systems, success often occurs when a failure finds a previously unknown, unexpected, or wholly unanticipated outcome that leads to improvements and a better future for that program. The latest test of the SM-3 IIA missile by the Missile Defense Agency is precisely the type of failure that will contribute to the program’s future success.
A next generation version of the Standard Missile 3, the SM-3 IIA program is being shepherded through the acquisition, test, and eventual deployment phases by the Department of Defense’s Missile Defense Agency. It is a first-of-its-kind joint project between the United States and the Government of Japan to develop an interceptor for ballistic missiles that is deployable at sea and on land. The program is an outgrowth of the Obama Administration program to use these types of missiles to defend the European continent. As with any complex weapons acquisition process, it must undergo a number of live-fire tests to prove that it meets the stated program objectives for defending U.S. national security interests and those of our allies.
Although the SM-3 IIA missile in this latest test failed to intercept the ballistic missile target, one has to look at the larger picture of this weapon’s system design. Rigorous test firings like these are specifically devised to push the limits of the system while also taking into account the complexity of the intercept geometry and exoatmospheric conditions that it operates under. Using a kinetic kill vehicle instead of a blast fragmentation warhead, the accuracy of the radar system guiding the warhead, along with the extreme closure velocities between the target and the kinetic warhead, raises the standard of performance to an extraordinary level.
Failures of systems often lead to better designs, improved performance, and more capable weapons to defend our national security interests. As part of the commissioning crew of USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), the first Aegis guided missile destroyer, I was intimately involved with the developmental and operational test and evaluation of every weapon system on the ship. During one test, in particular, it was a long-range test of the missile system on a high-altitude inbound target. While appearing routine in nature, the profile of the target was complex to challenge the system and operators alike in responding to this type of missile attack.
Upon detection, the Aegis Weapon System responded exactly as designed, however, a fault in the terminal phase section of the software caused three sequential system failures in a row, the ship never fired its missile(s) in response to the threat, and technically, the test was a failure of the ship to adequately react to the threat. Upon further examination and unbeknownst to the crew, a known software fault had been left in the system on a “gamble” that those exact conditions would never be experienced in the real world.
If this situation had been repeated in a wartime scenario, the ship would have suffered extensive damage, and untold casualties would have resulted from this deliberate oversight decision. While the design engineers may have known about this fault, they do not have to live with the consequences of a failure; the ship, crew, and ultimately, the families will ultimately bear that burden.
Robust and realistic testing scenarios and the failures that will result from them are a normal occurrence and should be accepted as part of the program, specifically to uncover the types of system and weapons system shortfalls that we experienced while fielding a next-generation destroyer and the latest iteration of the Aegis Combat System. The Navy learned from that experience, built a better destroyer and more robust Aegis Weapon System, and the engineering community went on to develop even better software to keep those weapons systems at the forefront of technology. Failure may not be an option, but when it occurs, the key to success is to learn from those failures to succeed in the future; those who defend our nation deserve no less.
CDR Lippold is a retired naval officer who was the Commanding Officer of USS Cole (DDG 67) when it survived a suicide terrorist attack by al Qaeda and is a highly regarded national security expert who currently serves as President of Lippold Strategies, LLC.

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